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Mounting scientifi c evidence is suggesting that various synthetic chemicals are ubiquitous 
in the household and natural environment, and are aff ecting reproductive health in 
humans. Yet litigation in response to exposure to harmful chemicals has had limited 
success. Th is is in large part because causation is often diffi  cult to prove, as exposure 
often occurs over long periods of time, and the sources of suspected chemical agents are 
ubiquitous and/or diff use. In light of these challenges, there is a need to consider new 
legal strategies to confront these harms. 
Th is article examines the potential for prenatal exposure to harmful chemicals to 
be approached as reproductive torts as opposed to toxic torts. Focusing on two groups 
of household chemicals – brominated fl ame retardants and phthalate s – this article 
identifi es the ways in which prenatal injury claims and birth torts (i.e. wrongful 
pregnancy, wrongful birth, and wrongful life cases) can inform future litigation 
regarding prenatal exposures to risky household chemicals. In particular, reproductive 
tort jurisprudence off ers a variety of ways of conceptualizing causation, injury and fault 
in cases where individuals are exposed to synthetic household chemicals before birth.
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I.  Introduction1
The human health eff ects of exposure to synthetic chemicals, ubiquitous in present-day society, call attention to the vulnerability 
of reproductive and developmental processes that may be infl uenced by 
these substances. Biological systems developing in utero and throughout 
childhood are particularly susceptible to environmental infl uence s,2 
and exposures may result in negative health eff ects, including harms to 
the reproductive system.3 Cases of exposure to diethylstilbestrol (DES) 
off er a historically signifi cant example in which exposure to synthetic 
1. Supported by grant RHF100625 and grant RHF-100626 from the 
Institute for Human Development, Child and Youth Health (IHDCYH), 
Canadian Institutes of Health Research (CIHR).
2. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists Committee 
on Health Care for Underserved Women & American Society for 
Reproductive Medicine Practice Committee, “Committee Opinion 
No 575: Exposure to Toxic Environmental Agents” (2013) 122:4 
Obstetrics & Gynecology 931 at 931; Philippe Grandjean et al, “Th e 
Faroes Statement: Human Health Eff ects of Developmental Exposure 
to Chemicals in Our Environment” (2008) 102:2 Basic & Clinical 
Pharmacology & Toxicology 73. 
3. For example, a number of human studies have shown that exposures to 
common household plasticizers (phthatlates) “are associated with a direct 
adverse eff ect on androgen function in men,” and linked to shortened 
anogenital distance. See Richard Grady & Sheela Sathyanarayana, 
“An Update on Phthalates and Male Reproductive Development and 
Function” (2012) 13:4 Current Urology Reports 307 at 309. 
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chemicals had substantive eff ects for those exposed in utero and for the 
children of those exposed in utero.4 In addition, fetuses and children 
face higher exposure rates to chemicals due to their smaller size, and, for 
children, the accumulation of toxic substances in breast milk and their 
close physical contact with household objects.5  
Currently, a number of household chemicals are under scrutiny 
due to their ubiquity and the identifi cation of potential harms to the 
reproductive health of those exposed in utero, particularly harms to 
male reproductive health. For example, brominated fl ame retardants 
(BFRs), found in furniture, carpeting, electronics, children’s pyjamas, 
and a number of other consumer products,6 are found in the blood of 
most of the general population and have been linked to altered testicular 
cells in male rats exposed in uter o.7 Epidemiological studies have also 
suggested the existence of correlative relationships between exposures 
to BFRs and reduced testis size, sperm concentratio n,8 altered hormone 
4. See Richard Goldberg, “Causation and Drugs: Th e Legacy of 
Diethylstilbestrol” (1996) 25 Anglo-Am L Rev 286; W Lenz, “A Short 
History of Th alidomide Embryopathy” (1988) 38:3 Teratology 203.
5. See for example Joseph L Jacobson, Sandra W Jacobson & Harold EB 
Humphrey, “Eff ects of Exposure to PCBs and Related Compounds 
on Growth and Activity in Children” (1990) 12:4 Neurotoxicology 
and Teratology 319 at 319 (on the breastmilk point); Th eo Colborn, 
Frederick S vom Saal & Ana M Soto, “Developmental Eff ects of 
Endocrine-Disrupting Chemicals in Wildlife and Humans” (1993) 
101:5 Environmental Health Perspectives 378 (on the vulnerability 
and permanent nature of exposure during development); Vincent F 
Garry, “Pesticides and Children” (2004) 198:2 Toxicology and Applied 
Pharmacology 152; Philippe Grandjean et al, “Th e Faroes Statement: 
Human Health Eff ects of Developmental Exposure to Chemicals in 
Our Environment” (2008) 102:2 Basic & Clinical Pharmacology & 
Toxicology 73 (on sensitivity of fetal and neonatal development).
6. Sheila R Ernest et al, “Eff ects of Chronic Exposure to an Environmentally 
Relevant Mixture of Brominated Flame Retardants on the Reproductive 
and Th yroid System in Adult Male Rats” (2012) 127:2 Toxicological 
Sciences 496.
7. Yi-Qian Ma, Understanding the Eff ects of Exposure to an Environmentally 
Relevant Mixture of Brominated Flame Retardant Congeners on the Function 
and Development of the Male Gonad (M Sc Th esis, McGill University 
Faculty of Medicine, 2013) [unpublished] at 61.
8. K Akutsu et al, “Polybrominated Diphenyl Ethers in Human Serum and 
Sperm Quality” (2008) 80:4 Bulletin of Environmental Contamination 
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level s,9 and birth weight anomalies.10 Phthalates are another class of 
household chemicals that are found in cleaning supplies, building 
materials, cosmetics, toys, food packaging, medical devices, clothing, and 
other plasticized consumer good s.11 Animal studies have demonstrated 
negative eff ects of phthalate exposure in utero, including reduced 
testosterone producti on12 as well as cryptorchidis m,13 hypospadias,14 
and shortened anogenital distan ce15 in males.16 Human studies have 
also suggested a correlation between in utero exposure to phthalates and 
reduced anogenital distance and cryptorchidis m.17 Th ough scientifi c 
Toxicology 345 at 349.
9. John D Meeker et al, “Polybrominated Diphenyl Ether (PBDE) 
Concentrations in House Dust are Related to Hormone Levels in Men” 
(2009) 407:10 Science of the Total Environment 3425 at 3428.
10. Sanna Lignell et al, “Prenatal Exposure to Polychlorinated Biphenyls 
(PCBs) and Polybrominated Diphenyl Ethers (PBDEs) May Infl uence 
Birth Weight Among Infants in a Swedish Cohort With Background 
Exposure: A Cross-sectional Study” (2013) 12:44 Environmental Health 
1.
11. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists Committee 
on Health Care for Underserved Women & American Society for 
Reproductive Medicine Practice Committee, supra note 2 at 933.
12. Daniel B Martinez-Arguelles et al, “In Utero Exposure to the 
Antiandrogen Di-(2-Ethylhexyl) Phthalate Decreases Adrenal Aldosterone 
Production in the Adult Rat” (2011) 85:1 Biology of Reproduction 51 at 
60.
13. Jane S Fisher et al, “Human ‘Testicular Dysgenesis Syndrome’: A Possible 
Model Using In-utero Exposure of the Rat to Dibutyl Phthalate” (2003) 
18:7 Human Reproduction (Oxford Journals) 1383.
14. Ibid. 
15. Bethany R Hannas, “Dose-Response Assessment of Fetal Testosterone 
Production and Gene Expression Levels in Rat Testes Following In Utero 
Exposure to Diethylhexyl Phthalate, Diisobutyl Phthalate, Diisoheptyl 
Phthalate, and Diisononyl Phthalate” (2011) 123:1 Toxicological 
Sciences 206; M Ema, E Miyawaki & K Kawashima, “Further 
Evaluation of Developmental Toxicity of Di-n-butyl Phthalate Following 
Administration During Late Pregnancy in Rats” (1998) 98:1-2 Toxicology 
Letters 87. 
16. Cryptorchidism occurs when “one or both testicles do not descend into 
the scrotum.” Hypospadias is a condition in which the “urethral opening 
is displaced toward the scrotum.” See Leonard J Paulozzi, “International 
Trends in Rates of Hypospadias and Cryptorchidism” (1999) 107:4 
Environmental Health Perspectives 297 at 297.
17. Shanna H Swan, “Environmental Phthalate Exposure in Relation to 
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studies have not conclusively demonstrated links between exposures to 
BFRs and phthalates and intergenerational reproductive harm, there is 
accumulating evidence about eff ects of in utero exposure to household 
chemicals and the development of the reproductive system. 
Over the past several decades, Canada and other countries have 
developed legislation and public policy responding to knowledge of 
these eff ects.18 In addition to state-based interventions, consumers 
Reproductive Outcomes and Other Health Endpoints in Humans” 
(2008) 108:2 Environmental Research 177.
18. For example, the 1999 Canadian Environmental Protection Act, SC 1999, 
c 33 [CEPA] is the primary legislation governing toxic chemicals in 
Canada, and following an expansion of the Act’s regulatory scheme in 
2008, the “use, [sale], off er for sale or import” of some widely used BFRs 
(namely polybrominated diphenyl ethers or PBDEs) was banned. Th e 
2006 expansion of the federal regulation of toxics was encapsulated under 
the three-part Chemicals Management Plan [CMP], which aimed to get 
“tough on toxics” through 1) issuing a “challenge” to industry to better 
self-regulate and provide information to the public about particularly 
hazardous chemicals; 2) increased regulation of “food, cosmetics, drugs 
or biological drugs and pesticides”; and 3) an expansion of funding for 
research “to learn more about the eff ects of chemical exposure on human 
health and the environment, as well as to provide the necessary means to 
measure the success of actions to control or reduce risks.” Th is included 
the highly-publicized banning of one phthalate plasticizer, Bisphenol 
A (BPA), used in hard plastic vessels such as baby bottles and re-usable 
water bottles. Other phthalates remain on the market and are found in 
personal care products (i.e. cosmetics and shampoo), though as of 1998 
there has been a voluntary withdrawal of two phthalates from products 
intended to be consumed or mouthed by young children. New regulations 
implemented in 2011 have since restricted the “advertising, sale and 
importation of toys and child care articles composed of vinyl containing 
phthalates” containing higher than regulated levels of any of six common 
phthalates. Th e regulation of toxic household chemicals in Canada, and 
particularly the CMP, has not included consistent requirements – leaving 
some chemicals on the market long after there is consensus about their 
toxicity while others are quickly banned – and has raised questions about 
whether government or industry should take on the onus for assessing 
harm. See Polybrominated Diphenyl Ethers Regulations, SOR/2008-
218, s 7(1); Dayna Nadine Scott, “Beyond BPA: We Need to Get 
Tough on Toxics,” Women & Environments Network Magazine 88/89 (1 
October 2011) 43; Government of Canada, Overview of the Chemicals 
Management Plan (2006), online: Government of Canada <http://www.
chemicalsubstanceschimiques.gc.ca/fact-fait/overview-vue-eng.php>; 
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are increasingly expected to manage their exposure, mitigating risk by 
following the advice of experts and making smart choices about the 
products they buy and us e.19 Advice about how to reduce exposures to 
BFRs includes, for example, replacing mattresses and sofas that are coated 
with BFRs with products that are not, or dusting and vacuuming more 
frequently to reduce exposures to contaminated house dus t.20 Advice 
about reducing exposure to phthalates includes paying attention to 
labelling to avoid products containing phthalates, more frequent cleaning 
of the home, and engaging in food preparation that avoids phthalate-
contaminated food-products and food-preparation products. For both 
groups of chemicals, the dominant means through which exposures can 
be avoided is household labour that most often falls to women: food 
preparation, household shopping, and cleaning.21 
Th e individualized need to avoid exposures is particularly problematic 
for pregnant women, who are already expected to make choices that 
optimize the health of their future child by avoiding certain behaviours 
(i.e. stressful activities, smoking, excessive weight gain)22 and products 
(i.e. raw fi sh, alcohol, caff eine, unpasteurized dairy)23 linked to fetal 
harm. Chemical exposure is particularly suspect given that “chemicals 
in pregnant women can cross the placenta, and in some cases, such as 
with methyl mercury, can accumulate in the fetus, resulting in higher 
fetal exposure than maternal exposure” and is, in many cases, associated 
Phthalates Regulations, SOR/2010-298, s 2.
19. Norah MacKendrick, Th e Individualization of Risk as Responsibility 
and Citizenship: A Case Study of Chemical Body Burdens (PhD Soc 
Th esis, University of Toronto Graduate Department of Sociology, 
2012) [unpublished, archived at https://tspace.library.utoronto.ca/
handle/1807/31850] at 36. 
20. Robyn Lee & Dayna Nadine Scott, “(Not) Shopping Our Way to Safety” 
(30 April 2014), online: Canadian Women’s Health Network <http://
www.cwhn.ca/en/node/46308>.
21. Ibid; MacKendrick, supra note 19 at 42.
22. See for example, Public Health Agency of Canada, Th e Sensible Guide to a 
Healthy Pregnancy (Ottawa: Public Health Agency of Canada, 2008).
23. Ibid. See also “Tips For a Healthy Pregnancy,” online: Eat Right Ontario 
<https://www.eatrightontario.ca/en/Articles/Pregnancy/Tips-for-a-
healthy-pregnancy.aspx>.
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with adverse “reproductive and developmental health outcomes.”24 Th e 
exceptional onus of protecting fetal health falls to pregnant women 
through their behaviours and consumption practices, even when 
exposures may be diffi  cult to prevent, either due to the ubiquity of 
household chemicals or the social, temporal, and economic challenges of 
avoiding exposures. Responsibility for chemical exposures, and especially 
fetal exposures, largely falls to women as mothers, pregnant women, or as 
hypothetical mothers-to-be.25
Th is “precautionary consumption,” – that is to say, the expectation 
that consumers should educate themselves about how to selectively 
choose the products they bring into their home as a means to minimize 
toxic exposures – works to individualize risk, putting the responsibility 
of reducing exposures to household chemicals on consumers, largely 
women, tasked with household management.26 Th e burdens of 
precautionary consumption are not only disproportionately placed 
on women (particularly on pregnant women), but also on women of 
lower socio-economic status as both exposures and resources (i.e. time, 
fi nancial capacity) diff er substantially among those of higher and lower 
socio-economic status. Precautionary consumption works to shift a 
collective concern – the toxic chemicals in consumer products and in 
the environment – and to put the responsibility for reducing exposures 
on individuals, primarily women, through their engagement with a free 
market in household chemicals.
Beyond legislative, regulatory, and market-based attempts to mitigate 
the harms of chemical exposures, there exists limited jurisprudence 
addressing environmental chemical exposures. Th is body of law has 
focused largely on “toxic torts” that, like precautionary consumption, 
also frame harm as a matter of individual responsibility and injury rather 
than a matter of collective and public health. In both individual and 
class-action claims, physiological harms are often too vaguely linked to 
chemical exposures and, when exposures occur over a long period of time, 
24. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists Committee 
on Health Care for Underserved Women & American Society for 
Reproductive Medicine Practice Committee, supra note 2 at 3.
25. Lee & Scott, supra note 20.
26. Ibid. 
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the potential impact of other factors is too great to establish causation. In 
short, these cases have been largely unsuccessful due to the challenging 
nature of establishing causation in negligence and the complex, diff use 
nature of exposure. While toxic household chemicals are ubiquitous and 
suspected of causing signifi cant physiological harm, there are few avenues 
for legal remedy. Making claims about harms caused by exposures to 
household chemicals is particularly challenging when those whose health 
is harmed are not only existing individuals, but also non-existent, that is 
to say, future people.  
Individual and class-action toxic tort claims in Canada have had 
little success to date. In contrast, a rich jurisprudence has developed 
in Canada regarding reproductive harms. Th ese cases cover numerous 
factual contexts, including (but not limited to): medical malpractice; 
assisted reproductive technologies; women’s conduct during pregnancy; 
pharmaceutical drug development; motor vehicle accidents; and violence 
against pregnant women. As noted above, emergent science is linking 
exposures to household chemicals to specifi c reproductive harms. Th e 
links between BFRs and phthalates and adverse male reproductive 
health described above27 suggest that exposures to household chemicals 
are a diff erent sort of toxic tort. Th at is, they are not merely a matter 
of environmental or health law, but may also fall under jurisprudence 
governing reproduction. Harms caused by exposures to household 
chemicals could be framed at once as matters of toxicity and reproduction 
and, given the problematic record of case law in Canada regarding toxicity, 
there might be greater potential for successful litigation if claims were 
articulated in terms of reproductive or birth torts rather than toxic torts. 
Characterizing reproductive harms incurred by exposures to household 
chemicals as a matter of reproductive harm fi rst, and of toxicity second, 
allows for lines of analysis developed in cases of reproductive injury to 
be applied to the case of chemical exposures. Th is line of argumentation 
at once addresses the need for fl exibility in establishing causation of 
prenatal harms and the need to protect women’s reproductive autonomy 
in the governance of pregnancy (and conception). 
Th is paper identifi es the relevance of legal approaches to reproductive 
27. Akutsu et al, supra note 8 at 349.
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harm in Canadian law to the case of harm caused by exposures to 
household chemicals prior to birth. It examines the broad history of 
reproductive torts in Canada – namely personal injury claims, “birth 
torts” (i.e. wrongful pregnancy, birth, and life claims), and preconception 
claims – identifying in turn the jurisprudential principles that may be 
applied to cases where the tortious act involves exposures to household 
chemicals prior to birth. To do so, the paper begins with a brief discussion 
of the harms caused by exposures to toxic chemicals, including household 
chemicals, identifying the limited potential for arguing causation in 
Canadian toxic tort cases. It then turns to its main purpose, providing an 
overview of reproductive torts beginning with the most straightforward 
type of case, namely, prenatal injury claims. Th ese claims are highly 
analogous to “ordinary” personal injury cases, the main diff erence being 
that the claimant is in utero at the time of his or her injury. Th is section 
of the paper also examines prenatal injury claims in which the child sues 
his or her own mother with respect to her prenatal conduct. Th is type of 
claim most clearly illustrates the concern over women’s autonomy that 
permeates reproductive tort. In its third section, the paper examines “birth 
torts,” in which the alleged harm itself is the birth of an unwanted child. 
It examines three classes of birth torts, namely “wrongful conception,” 
“wrongful birth,” and “wrongful life” cases, though these categories are 
highly contested.28 Th ese cases highlight the struggle to recognize the 
rights of parents to reproductive autonomy while also recognizing the 
value of the lives of children. In section four, the paper examines cases of 
prenatal injury where the negligence is alleged to have occurred not while 
the child was in utero, but prior to conception. Th is type of claim raises 
several concerns centering on the feasibility of imposing a duty toward 
one who does not yet exist. In its fi fth section, the paper examines cases 
that defy the neat characterizations set out above, including cases where 
both prenatal injury claims or preconception injury claims and “birth 
torts” are at issue. Th e paper concludes by identifying that although tort 
law is limited in its ability to address harms potentially caused by prenatal 
and preconception exposures to household chemicals, reproductive torts 
off er important insights useful to developing a more robust approach to 
28. See discussion of this categorization below at note 146.
88 
 
Cattapan, Mykitiuk & Pioro, Notions of Reproductive Harm
addressing intergenerational reproductive harm.
II.  Chemical Exposures and Toxic Torts
Research has long demonstrated that exposure to a wide variety of 
chemicals in suffi  cient dosage can have detrimental health eff ects.29 
Canadians are exposed to an array of “known and suspected carcinogens, 
hormone disruptors, developmental toxins and neurotoxins” due to 
their presence in consumer products, the food and water supply, soil, 
and in minute quantities, the environmen t.30 Indeed, these chemicals 
are everywhere. Recent attention has been paid to chemicals that alter 
the development of the reproductive system or that may interfere with 
the endocrine system when exposures occur in utero, resulting in adverse 
results for sperm and oocyte development, low birth weight, congenital 
anomalies, premature birth, and other adverse eff ects.31 
Th e known and suspected eff ects of specifi c chemical exposures 
are particularly important to examine in the legal context due to their 
intergenerational eff ects and the complex nature of any potential litigation. 
BFRs and phthalates, for example, are suspected to have adverse eff ects 
on both male and female development of the reproductive tract when 
exposures occur in utero, based on fi ndings in rodent studies.32 Although 
the human health eff ects of BFRs (as mentioned above) are unknown, 
epidemiological studies have suggested that there are adverse eff ects on 
the male reproductive system including reduced testis size and reduced 
sperm concentration. Th e endocrine system may also be aff ected, as 
epidemiological studies have shown changes in hormone levels associated 
29. Royal Commission on New Reproductive Technologies, Proceed 
with Care: Final Report of the Royal Commission on New Reproductive 
Technologies (Ottawa: Minister of Government Services Canada, 1993) at 
268.
30. Lynda Collins & Heather McLeod-Kilmurray, “Toxic Battery: A Tort for 
our Time?” (2008) 16 Tort Law Rev 131 at 131.
31. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists Committee 
on Health Care for Underserved Women & American Society for 
Reproductive Medicine Practice Committee, supra note 2 at 933.
32. Martinez-Arguelles et al, supra note 12; Fisher et al, supra note 13 at 
1383; Hannas, supra note 15 at 206.
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with exposures to certain BFRs.33 With respect to phthalates, both human 
and animal studies have suggested that in utero exposures may result in 
reduced anogenital distance and cryptorchidism.34 
Prenatal and preconception exposures are of particular interest in 
regards to BFRs and phthalates due to the suspected transgenerational 
eff ects of these chemicals. Both BFRs and phthalates are known 
endocrine-disrupting chemicals, that is, chemicals that interfere with 
normal hormone action in the body and consequently disrupt cell 
metabolism, “reproduction, development, or behaviour.”35 Perhaps the 
best-known example is that of diethylstilbestrol (or DES),36 a long-
prescribed synthetic estrogen that was used to prevent miscarriages in 
cases of high-risk pregnancy. Adverse health outcomes of exposure to DES 
emerged over time, particularly for female off spring exposed in utero, 
including a high occurrence of a rare form of vaginal cancer, reduced 
fertility, high rates of ectopic pregnancy, increased breast cancer, and 
early menopause, amongst others.37 Early research on third generation 
DES off spring suggests adverse health outcomes for the children of those 
exposed in utero including “penile and testicular anomalies” such as high 
rates of cryptorchidism38 in male off spring; delayed menarche in female 
off spring;39 and skeletal and heart anomalies in both male and female 
off spring.40 Th e case of DES illustrates that the implications of exposure 
33. Meeker et al, supra note 9 at 3428. 
34. Swan, supra note 17 at 179. 
35. Canadian Environmental Protection Act, SC 1999, c 33, s 43 [CEPA]. 
36. See discussion below at note 199.  
37. Sheela Sathyanarayana et al, “Environmental Exposures: How to Counsel 
Preconception and Prenatal Patients in the Clinical Setting” (2012) 
207:6 American Journal of Obstetrics and Gynecolology 463 at 468; 
D Andrew Crain et al, “Female Reproductive Disorders: Th e Roles of 
Endocrine-Disrupting Compounds and Developmental Timing” (2008) 
90:4 Fertility and Sterility 911 at 912; Nicolas Kalfa et al, “Prevalence 
of Hypospadias in Grandsons of Women Exposed to Diethylstilbestrol 
During Pregnancy: A Multigenerational National Cohort Study” (2011) 
95:8 Fertility and Sterility 2574 at 2574.
38. Kalfa et al, ibid.
39. Linda Titus-Ernstoff  et al, “Menstrual and Reproductive Characteristics 
of Women Whose Mothers Were Exposed In  Utero to Diethylstilbestrol 
(DES)” (2006) 35:4 International Journal of Epidemiology 862.
40. Linda Titus-Ernstoff  et al, “Birth Defects in the Sons and Daughters of 
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may extend far beyond the person immediately exposed, to their child in 
utero as well as to their grandchildren yet-to-be-conceived.
Research on other endocrine disrupters is increasingly demonstrating 
links between exposures and transgenerational reproductive outcomes 
recalling the eff ects of DES. For example, studies demonstrate that rats 
exposed to certain endocrine disrupters (namely the pesticide vinclozolin) 
known to cause altered fertility have passed anomalies “down to nearly 
every male in subsequent generations.”41 Th ere is also reason to believe 
that such eff ects may be occurring in the case of BFRs, as animal studies 
have shown that exposing American male kestrels to certain BFRs has 
multigenerational eff ects on reproductive success.42 With respect to 
phthalates, recent research has demonstrated that following exposure 
of mice in utero, “abnormal testicular function” persisted in subsequent 
generations, amongst other anomalies.43 
While scholars are continuing to study the transgenerational eff ects 
Women Who Were Exposed In Utero to Diethylstilbestrol (DES)” (2010) 
33:2 International Journal of Andrology 377.
41. Matthew D Anway et al, “Epigenetic Transgenerational Actions of 
Endocrine Disruptors and Male Fertility” (2005) 308:5727 Science 
1466; Jocelyn Kaiser, “Endocrine Disrupters Trigger Fertility Problems in 
Multiple G fenerations” (2005) 308:5727 Science 1391 at 1391.
42. Sarah C Marteinson et al, “Multi-generational Eff ects of Polybrominated 
Diphenylethers Exposure: Embryonic Exposure of Male American 
Kestrels (Falco Sparverius) to DE-71 Alters Reproductive Success and 
Behaviors” (2010) 29:8 Environmental Toxicology and Chemistry 1740; 
Kim J Fernie et al, “Changes in Reproductive Courtship Behaviors of 
Adult American Kestrels (Falco sparverius) Exposed to Environmentally 
Relevant Levels of the Polybrominated Diphenyl Ether Mixture, 
DE-71” (2008) 102:1 Toxicological Sciences 171; Kim J Fernie et al, 
“Environmentally Relevant Concentrations of DE-71 and HBCD Alter 
Eggshell Th ickness and Reproductive Success of American Kestrels” 
(2009) 43:6 Environmental Science & Technology 2124.
43. Timothy J Doyle et al, “Transgenerational Eff ects of Di-(2-ethylhexyl) 
Phthalate on Testicular Germ Cell Associations and Spermatogonial Stem 
Cells in Mice” (2013) 88:5 Biology of Reproduction 1 at 10.
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of phthalates and BFRs in both human44 and animal45 populations, 
the data is emergent and far from conclusive. Moreover, determining 
causation of any such eff ects is particularly diffi  cult given the inconsistent 
nature of fi ndings in both human and animal studies. Further, exposures 
to household chemicals typically occur in ways that are diff use and 
cumulative, that is to say, emergent from innumerable sources and 
occurring over a long period of time. Simply put, it is diffi  cult to establish 
the cause of chemical exposures when the science remains unclear and, 
furthermore, when we are always already exposed. Exposures may also 
predate conception and birth, insofar as one’s exposure may aff ect the 
health of one’s child not yet conceived, in utero, or the off spring of the 
child in utero (or the child yet-to-be-conceived).
Despite the known and suspected reproductive harms caused by 
exposure to household chemicals, litigation has been limited. In the 
Canadian context, there are very few cases that address reproductive harm 
in relation to exposures to household chemicals, in part because of the 
challenge of establishing a cause-and-eff ect relationship between chemical 
exposures and physiological harm. Th e criminal justice system off ers few 
opportunities for litigation where harm is incurred due to exposures 
to household chemicals, and tort law (most often through claims of 
negligence) has been the site where relevant jurisprudence has been 
developed. However, toxic tort jurisprudence has not seen much success, 
either as individual or class action claims. Two successful cases of toxic 
exposures associated with individual harm are Leibel v South Qu’Appel le 
(Rural Municipality)46 and MacDonald v Sebastia n,47 both cases of arsenic-
44. See for example Chanley M Small et al, “Reproductive Outcomes Among 
Women Exposed to a Brominated Flame Retardant In Utero” (2011) 
66:4 Archives of Environmental & Occupational Health 201. See also 
Donatella Caserta et al, “Th e Infl uence of Endocrine Disruptors in a 
Selected Population of Infertile Women” (2013) 29:5 Gynecological 
Endocrinology 444.
45. See for example Rylee Phuong Do et al, “Non-monotonic Dose Eff ects 
of In Utero Exposure to Di(2-ethylhexyl)phthalate (DEHP) on Testicular 
and Serum Testosterone and Anogenital Distance in Male Mouse Fetuses” 
(2012) 34:4 Reproductive Toxicology 614. 
46. [1944] 1 DLR 369 (Sask CA) [Leibel].
47. (1987), 81 NSR (2d) 189 (SC(TD)) [MacDonald]. 
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tainted drinking water. In Leibel, the plaintiff  was “poisoned with deeply 
injurious results” by drinking well water that had been contaminated 
with arsenic due to the negligent mixing of grasshopper poison-bait 
by the municipality taking place nearby.48 Th e plaintiff  suff ered “much 
pain and nausea”; “lost … use of his hands and feet”; impaired “bodily 
functions”; and a deterioration of his general “condition of health.”49 
In MacDonald, a landlord did not disclose the toxic levels of arsenic in 
the water supply of his tenants, despite prior knowledge.50 Th e plaintiff s 
argued that the landlord had a duty to disclose the levels of arsenic, and 
Justice Burchell, fi nding that the actions of the defendant were therefore 
negligent, awarded damages. Th e causation in this case was very clear, 
with the plaintiff s experiencing fl u-like symptoms, nausea, cramps, and 
diarrhoea (which are conclusively linked to arsenic poisoning) following 
consumption of the toxic water supply.51 
Th ough reproductive harms were not explicitly at issue, both Leibel 
and MacDonald off er examples of the type of negligence claim regarding 
toxic exposures likely to succeed in Canadian jurisprudence. Negligence 
claims rely on four requirements for a successful claim, namely the 
establishment of duty on the part of the defendant, a breach of said duty, 
a causal connection between the breach of duty and the harm incurred, 
and real material damage, injury or harm.52 Causation is integral here, 
and the near-immediacy of the harms and the direct relationship between 
arsenic poisoning and the plaintiff s’ health eff ects made the tortious 
actions relatively easy to establish. Unlike in utero or preconception 
exposures to household chemicals, the plaintiff s were either children or 
adults harmed directly by exposures associated with the negligence of 
the defendant, causation was clear and direct, and the eff ects were nearly 
immediate.53 
48. Supra note 46 at para 1.
49. Ibid at para 9.
50. Supra note 47 at paras 1, 3.
51. Ibid at para 6. 
52. J A Jolowicz & T Ellis Lewis, Winfi eld on Tort, 8th ed (London: Sweet & 
Maxwell,1967) at 42 ff .
53. Other cases where injury in negligence is limited to a single or small-
group exposed to toxics have generally been dismissed due to a lack of 
clarity in causation. See for example Nichols (Guardian of ) v Koch Oil 
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Where intergenerational harm has been claimed, cases have been 
dismissed due to an inability to demonstrate clear causation. For 
example, in the case of Martin (Litigation guardian of ) v Glaze-Bloc 
Products In c,54 an employee of Glaze-Bloc Products Inc. was exposed 
to trichloroethylene, a synthetic chemical most often used in industrial 
cleaning and in some household products.55 Th is exposure was alleged 
to cause the neural tube anomaly experienced by the infant plaintiff , the 
employee’s child.56 However, while Glaze-Bloc Products was found to be 
at fault for the chemical exposures experienced by Tom Martin, Justice 
Morin found that there was not “valid evidence to support a cause and 
eff ect relationship between”57 the chemical exposures and the “neural 
tube defects” of the child.58 Th e signifi cant challenge of establishing 
causation in cases of environmental exposures is particularly apparent 
in Martin as the possibility that factors and exposures other than that 
which occurred due to the actions of Glaze-Bloc Products Inc., as well 
as the limitations of existing research on the chemical in question, 
undermined the capacity of the plaintiff s to demonstrate concretely a 
direct relationship between cause and eff ect.59 Given that tort law has 
conventionally required the plaintiff  to demonstrate the likelihood that 
the defendant’s actions or inactions resulted in the injuries in question, 
in many cases the multifactorial nature of reproductive harm, the diff use 
nature of chemical exposures, and the lack of substantive scientifi c 
support to make direct evidentiary causal claims, make causation in cases 
Col, [1998] BCJ No 1944 (QL) (SC); Guimond Estate v Fiberglas Canada 
Inc (1999), 221 NBR (2d) 118 (CA); Canada v Grenier, 2005 FCA 348; 
Stucke v Richard McDonald & Associates Ltd, 2006 ABQB 239; MacIntyre 
v Cape Breton District Health Authority, 2009 NSSC 202.
54. 2007 CarswellOnt 9457 (WL Can) (Sup Ct) [Martin].
55. Environment Canada Government of Canada, “Environment Canada 
- Pollution and Waste – Trichloroethylene” (13 August 2009), online: 
Environment Canada <http://www.ec.gc.ca/toxiques-toxics/Default.
asp?lang=En&n=98E80CC6-1&xml=8E5CDE87-0226-4C47-BADC-
161ED8A72654>.
56. Martin, supra note 54 at para 1.
57. Ibid at para 73.
58. Ibid.
59. Ibid at para 131.
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like Martin nearly impossible to prove.60  
Class action toxic torts in Canada have been limited by the 
diffi  culties of acquiring class certifi cation, though the benefi ts of 
pursuing such claims in cases of exposures to environmental toxins are 
clear. In all claims of toxic torts, the cost, diffi  culty of identifying the 
time and place of long-term exposures, and limited scientifi c evidence 
substantiating cause and eff ect too often preclude success in cases where 
the tort of negligence is argue d.61 Class action suits off er the opportunity 
for plaintiff s to pool their resources in cases “where complexity and 
expert scientifi c evidence make confl icting fi ndings likely and individual 
litigation virtually impossible to aff ord.”62 Further, for the courts, class 
actions allow for limited judicial resources to be more economically used 
in cases where the facts are essentially the same, in order to “improve 
access to justice by making economical the prosecution of claims that any 
one class member would fi nd too costly to prosecute on his or her own,” 
and enable claims substantial enough to require “actual and potential 
wrongdoers” to change their behaviours to reduce or eliminate the “harm 
they are causing, or might cause, to the public .”63 
However, following Patrick Hayes, there has been a too-narrow 
understanding of causation in class action claims regarding toxic exposures 
that has limited success in establishing class-action certifi cation.64 Hayes 
identifi es the case of Hollick v Toronto (City) as establishing a restrictive 
framework in recognizing mass toxic torts that set the stage for future 
refusals to grant certifi cation in environmental torts claims. In Hollick, the 
plaintiff  claimed that the “noise and physical pollution”65 from a nearby 
landfi ll were excessive, making a class action nuisance claim on behalf 
60. Jocelyn Kaiser, “Endocrine Disrupters Trigger Fertility Problems in 
Multiple Generations” (2005) 308:5727 Science 1391 at 1391.
61. Patrick Hayes, “Exploring the Viability of Class Actions Arising from 
Environmental Toxic Torts: Overcoming Barriers to Certifi cation” (2009) 
19:3 J Envtl L & Prac 189 at 190.
62. Heather McCleod-Kilmurray, “Hollick and Environmental Class Actions: 
Putting the Substance into Class Action Procedure” (2002) 34 Ottawa L 
Rev 263 at 283.
63. Hollick v Toronto (City), 2001 SCC 68 at para 15 [Hollick].
64. Supra note 61. 
65. Supra note 63 at para 2.
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of 30,000 residents living near the landfi ll. Th e motions judge certifi ed 
a class action, but the class certifi cation was overturned in Divisional 
Court “on the grounds that the appellant had not stated an identifi able 
class and had not satisfi ed the commonality requirement.”66 Essentially, 
each of the individual plaintiff s would have diff erently experienced the 
nuisance dependant on various factors, including their proximity to 
the landfi ll.67 Th e Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal. Th e 
limitations placed on class certifi cation were also made clear in Ring v 
Canada68 in which it was alleged that “the spraying of herbicides” near 
the Gagetown military base from 1956 onward “materially contributed 
to or materially contributed to the risk of causing, lymphoma”69 for the 
plaintiff s. Th ough the trial judge found that the certifi cation for a class 
action had been met, on appeal Justice Cameron found for the court that 
the class was too broadly conceived, as it included not only those who 
were exposed to toxic chemicals at Gagetown after 1956, but also those 
“who claim to”70 have been exposed. For Cameron JA, no acceptable 
limits to the class of those claiming exposure were applied, and therefore 
class certifi cation could not be accorded.  
In contrast, in Smith v Inco Limite d,71 certifi cation for a toxic torts 
case was granted. Initially, certifi cation was denied by Justice Nordheimer 
at the Ontario Superior Court of Justice as the geographic boundaries of 
contamination were “arbitrary” (i.e. including people without claims and 
excluding people with relevant claims).72 On appeal, class certifi cation 
was granted, but only once the class was narrowed from the broader class 
of those who experienced physiological harms alleged to be caused by 
exposures to certain “toxic and carcinogenic chemicals”73 to extend only 
66. Ibid at para 8.
67. Ibid at para 32.  
68. 2010 NLCA 20.
69. Ibid at para 1.
70. Ibid at para 71. 
71. 2011 ONCA 628 [Smith].
72. Pearson v Inco Ltd (2002), 33 CPC (5th) 264 at para 101 (Ont Sup Ct). 
73. Th ere has been greater success in toxic tort class action suits under Droite 
Civile in Quebec. See St Lawrence Cement v Barrette, 2008 SCC 64; and 
Comité d’environnement de La Baie inc c Société d’électrolyse et de chimie 
Alcan ltée, [1990] RJQ 655 (Qc CA). 
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to those whose property values were adversely aff ected. Th e claim on the 
merits failed at the Court of Appeal.74
Th e poor record of litigation vis-à-vis exposures to synthetic chemicals 
in Canada has not precluded scholars from theorizing how such tort 
actions might be undertaken. Th ough harms caused by exposures to 
synthetic chemicals have most often been articulated as negligence claims, 
Lynda Collins and Heather McLeod-Kilmurray imagine how Canadians, 
exposed to a wide variety of chemicals without their consent, might 
be able to make a claim of “toxic battery.” “Toxic battery,” they argue, 
occurs in “any battery in which the alleged intentional contact takes the 
form of exposure to a toxic substance released by the defendant.”75 If 
battery is “the intentional application of harmful or off ensive contact” 
with the plaintiff ’s person,76 and intent need not be specifi c or desired, 
but merely relies on any consequences that result from the defendant’s 
conduct (following the doctrine of constructive intent),77 it follows that 
those responsible for exposing plaintiff s to synthetic chemicals might be 
understood as committing battery. 
Collins and McLeod-Kilmurray identify the potential utility of 
battery in toxic torts in part as a means to circumvent the challenge 
posed by establishing causation in claims of negligence. As in Martin, 
due to the limitations of existing scientifi c research on the eff ects of 
environmental exposures to synthetic chemicals, and further, because 
of the often diff use nature of exposure, causation has been too diffi  cult 
to establish, rendering negligence claims a losing proposition. As 
battery relies on the idea that there is “harmful or off ensive contact”78 
experienced by the plaintiff , in which there is some sort of incursion 
on their person that violates their dignity regardless of the harm, “toxic 
battery” engenders an understanding that the harm is the exposure in and 
of itself, rather than any specifi c physiological eff ects. However, as these 
authors identify, given the widespread nature of chemical exposures, the 
claim that individuals are subject to battery when involuntarily exposed 
74. Smith, supra note 71. 
75. Collins & McLeod-Kilmurray, supra note 30 at 132.
76. Ibid.
77. Ibid.
78. Ibid at 143.
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to synthetic chemicals could ostensibly be applied to nearly everyone in 
the industrial world, if not elsewhere. Th e overly broad scope of toxic 
battery, then, suggests that it is unlikely to be successful as a strategy to 
address cases of environmental exposures to synthetic chemicals, though 
it is particularly useful in its capacity to sidestep the issue of causation 
that hinders relevant negligence claims.
Rather than theorize toxic torts as battery, Dayna Scott suggests that 
the preoccupation of tort law with proof of physical damages experienced 
by individuals impedes justice. Scott interrogates the relationship between 
tort law and the body, identifying that the association between physical 
damage experienced by individuals is too limited an understanding of 
harm to provide a remedy in the case of toxic torts. Scott argues that if 
tort law is a means to address the harms incurred by one individual (or 
group) at the hands of another, tort law is insuffi  cient to engage with 
harms caused by toxic chemicals as it is “blind to the public dimensions 
of the problem and the way that state law, through the regulatory design, 
shapes the behaviour of key actors, notably in this case, polluters.”79 
Addressing the adverse eff ects of household chemicals as a matter of tort 
law inherently frames exposure as a private matter when rightly, for Scott, 
it is a matter of public health, public interest, and state responsibility.
Nevertheless, toxic torts continue to be used to address matters 
of chemical exposure with limited success. Th e challenges of proving 
causation of adverse health eff ects are often insurmountable for plaintiff s, 
particularly in cases that are not class-action matters and when the harms 
are claimed as a matter of negligence. Causation is even more diffi  cult 
to prove in toxic torts cases when, as in Martin, reproductive harms 
(particularly those that occur prior to conception) are alleged.80 However, 
as research on phthalates and BFRs increasingly demonstrates there are 
links between in utero exposures and reproductive harm, exposures to 
household chemicals might be thought of both as a toxic tort and as 
a matter of reproductive harm. As toxic torts claims have largely been 
unsuccessful in the Canadian context, partly due to the problematic 
79. Dayna Nadine Scott, “‘Gender-benders’: Sex and Law in the Constitution 
of Polluted Bodies” (2009) 17:3 Fem Legal Stud 241 at 260.
80. Supra note 54.
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nature of establishing causation, cases in which reproductive harms are 
associated with household chemicals might instead look to reproductive 
torts as a line of argumentation. Reproductive torts (i.e. prenatal injury 
claims, birth torts, and preconception claims) may off er a point of entry 
for litigation addressing reproductive harms caused by exposures to 
household chemicals. 
III. Reproductive Torts
A.  Prenatal Injury Claims
Prenatal injury claims occur when the tortious act harms or is alleged to 
have harmed a child in utero. Th ese cases can be roughly categorized in 
two diff erent ways. First, prenatal injury claims may be made when the 
harm incurred is alleged to be caused by a breach of duty on the part of 
the defendant. In these cases, the driver of a motor vehicle (as in early 
cases) or health services workers (i.e. physicians, nurses) breach a duty 
of care resulting in the alleged harms to the fetus. Th e second type of 
prenatal injury claim is that in which a pregnant woman is liable for the 
tortious action. In these particularly controversial cases, a woman in some 
way harms herself (accidentally or otherwise), and alleged harm to her 
fetus is the result of her action. Both types of claims are discussed below 
to demonstrate the theorization of fetal harm, liability, and causation in 
prenatal injury negligence cases as a means to identify the utility of these 
approaches for potential litigation regarding reproductive harms caused 
by in utero exposures to household chemicals. 
In Canada, the earliest precedents relating to reproductive harm 
occurred in the case of accidents involving motor vehicles. Th ough 
decided under Quebec’s civil law, the 1933 Supreme Court of Canada 
decision in Montreal Tramways Co v Léveillé 81 featured a common law 
analysis, and it has served as a precedent in later common law decisions. 
In this case, a pregnant woman was “descending from a tram car” when, 
“by reason of the negligence” of the employee of the appellant (the 
“motorman”), she fell and was injured; her child was born with “club 
81. [1933] SCR 456 [Montreal Tramways].
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feet.”82 At issue was whether the available evidence allowed the jury to 
reasonably fi nd that the fall caused the child’s club feet, and whether 
the child, while in utero, was covered by Article 1053 of the civil code, 
which read, “[e]very person capable of discerning right from wrong is 
responsible for the damage caused by his fault to another, whether by 
positive act, imprudence, neglect or want of skill.”83
Th e majority judgment, written by Justice Lamont, surveys UK, 
Irish, and American precedent on the legal status of the unborn child, 
fi nding that the common law recognizes the separate existence of the 
unborn child for inheritance and criminal law purposes, provided that 
the child is subsequently born alive. Th e judgment goes on to state that 
existing common law authority does not apply this rule in personal 
injury cases, but that the civil law employs a legal fi ction wherein it 
treats a conceived but unborn child as having been born at a particular 
time for his or her benefi t, if subsequently born alive. With respect to 
causation, Lamont J held that the medical expert testimony arguing that 
the cause of club feet was unknown did not negate the testimony of 
the experts who believed it was very probable that the accident caused 
the child’s condition, and consequently, the jury could reasonably have 
found a causal relationship.84 Beyond addressing and accepting the 
vague probability of causation, the result of the majority decision was a 
precedent-setting judgment that eff ectively determined the retrospective 
application of negligence in utero, as long as the child was born alive.
Th e logic of Montreal Tramways would be put to use in the Ontario 
case of Duval et al v Seguin et a l,85 the Canadian common law precedent-
setting case on tort recovery for injuries sustained while in utero. Th e facts 
concerned a motor vehicle accident involving several individuals, one of 
whom was thirty-one weeks pregnant at the time, and whose child was 
born prematurely about three weeks later.86 Th e High Court described 
that the child was “permanently handicapped both physically and 
82. Ibid at 458. 
83. Ibid at 459.
84. Montreal Tramways, ibid at 473.
85. (1973) 1 OR (2d) 482 (CA) [Duval 1973], aff ’g [1972] 2 OR 686 (H Ct 
J) [Duval 1972].
86. Duval 1972, ibid at para 32.
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mentally”87 as a result of “brain injuries suff ered in the accident.”88 Th e 
judgments of the High Court and the Court of Appeal, both of which 
allowed recovery by the infant plaintiff , referred to American,89 Irish,90 
and Australian91 authorities promoting recovery for injuries sustained 
while en ventre sa mère. Th e High Court judgment, echoing Montreal 
Tramways, notes:
In my opinion it is not necessary in the present case to consider whether the 
unborn child was a person in law or at which stage she became a person. For 
negligence to be a tort there must be damages. While it was the foetus or child 
en ventre sa mère who was injured, the damages sued for are the damages 
suff ered by the plaintiff  Ann since birth and which she will continue to suff er 
as a result of that injury.92
Th e High Court dismissed the argument that the diffi  culty in proving 
causation in prenatal injury cases justifi ed barring such claims, suggesting 
that though older cases were invested in the diffi  culty of establishing 
causation, “scientifi c advances”93 suggest that the relationship between 
certain acts and prenatal injuries are stronger than ever. Th e High Court 
also addressed the issue of causation by referring to the then-landmark 
case of Donoghue v Stevenson,94 writing that “[u]nder the doctrine of 
M’Alister (or Donoghue) v. Stevenson … an unborn child is within 
the foreseeable risk incurred by a negligent motorist. When the unborn 
child becomes a living person and suff ers damages as a result of prenatal 
injuries caused by the fault of the negligent motorist the cause of action is 
87. Ibid at para 37.
88. Ibid at paras 35-36.
89. Ibid at paras 49-51.
90. Duval 1972, ibid at paras 56-57.
91. Duval 1972, ibid at paras 63-64; Duval 1973, supra note 85 at para 9, 
citing Watt v Rama, [1972] VR 353 [Watt]. Watt established precedent 
regarding the capacity to sue for injuries incurred prior to birth, namely 
en ventre sa mère. Th e case involved a motor vehicle accident in which 
it was held that a duty of care was owed to a child born alive if injuries 
were sustained in utero. See also Fiona Anne Kumari Campbell, Th e Great 
Divide : Ableism and Technologies of Disability Production (PhD Th esis, 
Queensland University of Technology, 2003) [unpublished] at 122-23.
92. Duval 1972, ibid at para 67.
93. Ibid at para 70. 
94. [1932] UKHL 100.
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completed.”95 Th e court awarded $31,000 to the infant plaintiff  and this 
award was upheld by the Court of Appeal.96
In Montreal Tramways, the majority decision did not hinge on 
causation as confl icting expert witnesses suggested that the child’s club 
feet may or may not have been the result of the “motorman’s” negligence. 
Further, in Duval the High Court was careful to note that as causation is 
diffi  cult to establish in cases of prenatal harms, in cases where there is a 
strong correlation between a negligent act and injuries sustained to a child 
en ventre sa mère, “plaintiff s should not be denied relief in proper cases 
because of possible diffi  culties of proof.”97 In short, though causation 
is a critical element of negligence claims, at least in the case of prenatal 
injuries related to motor vehicles causation is inherently tenuous and a 
failure to establish clear causation has not always prevented successful 
claims.98
While accidents involving motor vehicles are one of the earliest 
scenarios in which prenatal injury claims were made in Canada, prenatal 
personal injury is also often litigated in scenarios involving labour and 
delivery. Numerous court decisions feature plaintiff s who allege that 
negligent care they and their mothers received in the hours, minutes or 
seconds prior to their birth resulted in severe injur y.99 In light of the 
95. Duval 1972, supra note 85 at para 71.
96. Ibid at para 72; Duval 1973, supra note 85 at para 11.
97. Duval 1972, ibid at para 70.
98. In addition to Montreal Tramways and Duval, the case of LaForge v McGee 
et al involves a fact scenario in which a pregnant woman is involved in 
a motor vehicle accident and her child, subsequently born alive, is born 
with disabilities. In this case, causation was relatively easily established 
through medical testimony and a very direct temporal relationship 
between the motor vehicle accident and pregnant woman’s symptoms 
(associated with the harm incurred by the infant plaintiff ). In this case, 
causation was seen to be direct and relatively simple for Justice Wood. See 
Laforge v McGee, [1988] BCJ No 1584 (QL) (SC).
99. See e.g. Preston v Chow, 2007 MBQB 318 [Preston]; Crawford (Litigation 
guardian of ) v Penney (2004), 26 CCLT (3d) 246 (CA) [Crawford]; 
Tsur-Shofer v Grynspan (2004). 131 ACWS (3d) 545 (Sup Ct); Fullerton 
(Guardian ad litem of ) v Delair, 2005 BCSC 204; Brito (Guardian 
ad litem of ) v Woolley, 2003 BCCA 397 (claim unsuccessful); Meyer 
v Gordon (1981), 17 CCLT 1 (SC); Bauer (Litigation guardian of ) v 
Seager, 2000 MBQB 113 [Bauer]; Anderson v Salvation Army Maternity 
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consequences of prenatal injury, which may include the need for constant 
care and a lifetime’s worth of lost earnings, damages in these types of cases 
often run into the millions of dollar s.100 Care providers that have been 
found liable for providing negligent prenatal care include obstetricians101 
and other attending physician s;102 medical resident s;103 nurse s;104 and 
midwives.105 Hospitals have also been found liable for negligence.106
Th ese cases rely on the premise that care providers owe a duty of 
care to both the pregnant woman and unborn child during pregnancy, as 
well as during labour and delivery.107 Further, there must be some causal 
link between the actions of the care providers and the harm incurred by 
the plaintiff . For example, the claim might be made that inadequate care 
in response to a high-risk pregnancy led to oxygen deprivation during 
labour causing the child to be born with “extensive and permanent brain 
injuries.”108 In addition, plaintiff s might claim that the failure to perform 
a caesarean section or refer to a specialist when raised led to a child being 
Hospital (1989), 93 NSR (2d) 141 (SC(TD)) (cerebral palsy and mental 
retardation allegedly caused by negligently performed vaginal breech 
delivery – claim failed for failure to establish negligence and causation).
100. Lusignan (Litigation guardian of ) v Concordia Hospital (1997), 117 Man 
R (2d) 241 (QB) at para 7 (negligent prenatal/delivery care led infant 
plaintiff  to be “severely mentally handicapped” and have “a mild degree of 
cerebral palsy” – awarded over $2.2 million); Carere v Cressman, 12 CCLT 
(3d) 217 (Sup Ct) [Carere] (midwife’s negligent prenatal care held to have 
caused the infant plaintiff ’s cerebral palsy – over $2.3 million in damages 
awarded); Ediger (Guardian ad litem of ) v Johnston, 2009 BCSC 386 
(negligently performed delivery causes quadriplegia and cerebral palsy – 
over $3 million in damages awarded); Crawford, supra note 99 (negligent 
delivery causes permanent brain injuries – infant awarded $10 million).
101. Crawford, supra note 99. 
102. Steinebach (Litigation guardian of ) v Fraser Health Authority, 2011 BCCA 
302 [Steinebach]; Crawford, ibid.
103. See Milne v St Joseph’s Health Centre (2009), 69 CCLT (3d) 208 (Sup Ct) 
[Milne]; Bauer, supra note 99.
104. Milne, ibid; Steinebach, supra note 102; Guerineau (Guardian ad litem of ) 
v Seger, 2001 BCSC 291 [Guerineau].
105. Carere, supra note 100.
106. Guerineau, supra note 104; Bauer, supra note 99.
107. See Milne, supra note 103 at paras 63-64; Crawford, supra note 99.
108. Crawford, ibid at para 1.
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aff ected by the herpes virus.109
Taken together, the motor vehicle and prenatal care cases discussed 
to this point illustrate the emergence and entrenchment of the right of 
the child born alive to sue for damages sustained before birth. Further, as 
a group these cases, and particularly those cases of fetal harm involving 
motor vehicle accidents, suggest that causation need not always be direct 
and clear. Causation, as in Preston and Crawford cited above, may be 
inferred from a breach of duty marked by inaction, or as in Montreal 
Tramways and Duval, may be based on perceived probability of harm 
following an injurious event (motor vehicle collision). Th e challenge of 
determining causation with certainty in cases of prenatal harm need not 
stand in the way of a remedy. 
In Duval, Justice Fraser outlined the challenges of establishing 
causation in cases of prenatal harm, stating the importance of not 
dismissing just claims in the absence of the science necessary to prove 
causation. He wrote for the court that: 
Some of the older cases suggest that there should be no recovery by a person 
who has suff ered prenatal injuries because of the diffi  culties of proof and of the 
opening it gives for perjury and speculation. Since those cases were decided 
there have been many scientifi c advances and it would seem that chances 
of establishing whether or not there are causal relationships between the act 
alleged to be negligent and the damage alleged to have been suff ered as a 
consequence are better now than formerly. In any event the Courts now have 
to consider many similar problems and plaintiff s should not be denied relief in 
proper cases because of possible diffi  culties of proof.110
Prenatal claims may, then, off er some hope for cases where prenatal 
exposures to household chemicals are at issue. Th ere is a clear history 
of negligence claims when fetal harm is linked to a breach of a duty of 
care including, at times, where a direct line between cause and eff ect is 
not apparent. Th is stands in contrast to claims of negligence related to 
toxic chemicals which, in the Canadian context, may be dismissed when 
causation is either unclear or indirect. Whereas in cases like MacDonald 
and Leibel exposure to arsenic was clear and specifi cally related to 
the symptoms experienced by the plaintiff s, in cases like Martin the 
109. Preston, supra note 99 at para 193.
110. Duval 1972, supra note 85 at para 70 [emphasis added].
104 
 
Cattapan, Mykitiuk & Pioro, Notions of Reproductive Harm
relationship between chemical exposures and the adverse health eff ects 
were too vague for the claim of negligence to succeed. 
In the case of either BFRs or phthalates, there are no clear guidelines 
regarding acceptable levels of exposure and bioaccumulation, and, as in 
Martin, without such guidelines from scientifi c or medical communities 
it might be diffi  cult to establish a relationship between adverse health 
outcomes and chemical exposures for purposes of litigation. Th e 
multifactorial nature of the symptoms that may be associated with 
exposures to household chemicals, such as cryptorchidism and low 
birth rate, may also raise doubt about the role of chemical exposures 
in reproductive health issues that may be experienced by those exposed 
in utero. Th e issue of establishing causation is further exacerbated 
by the challenge of fi nding an identifi able defendant in such cases, as 
contemporary Western households typically include a wide variety of 
products that contain either BFRs111 or phthalates.112 Furthermore, 
due to the ongoing nature of these exposures, there is little possibility 
of identifying the particular product or manufacturer to which specifi c 
adverse health eff ects can be attributed. Establishing direct and clear 
causation between exposure to household chemicals and adverse health 
eff ects is unlikely due to the diff use and pervasive nature of exposures, 
compounded by the still-unclear science on the eff ects of these chemicals, 
and the challenges of fi nding an identifi able plaintiff . If tort action 
requires an identifi able defendant, quantifi able damage, and a causal 
relationship between the defendant and the harm incurred,113 in the 
theoretical cases involving exposures to household chemicals, two out of 
the three criteria (i.e. an identifi able defendant, and a causal connection), 
are not clearly present.  
B.  Prenatal Injury Claims Against Pregnant Women 
Th e second category of prenatal injury claims is that which occurs when a 
mother is the tortfeasor and is believed to have caused harms sustained by 
111. See text accompanying note 7. 
112. See text accompanying note 2. 
113. Albert C Lin, “Beyond Tort: Compensating Victims of Environmental 
Toxic Injury” (2005) 78:6 S Cal L Rev 1439 at 1445.
105(2015) 1 CJCCL
a fetus. Th ese cases are limited in the Canadian context as the Canadian 
judiciary has largely been resistant to interfere with women’s reproductive 
autonomy, particularly following R v Morgentaler.114 Women are not 
typically held liable for risks or harm enacted on a fetus, suggesting that 
the governance of pregnancy is a matter of reproductive autonomy, and 
should be addressed by public policy rather than judicial intervention. 
Th e case o f Winnipeg Child & Family Services (Northwest Area) v 
DFG115 was critical to establishing the position of non-intervention in 
pregnancy taken by the courts in Canad a,116 though it considers the 
actions of an organization acting on behalf of the interests of a fetus 
against a pregnant woman (rather than the in utero exposure to harms 
experienced by a child born alive ).117 Th is case involved the attempt of 
Winnipeg Child and Family Services to obtain a court order detaining a 
pregnant Aboriginal woman who was addicted to sniffi  ng glue, in order to 
protect her unborn child from neurological damage.118 Th e issues before 
114. [1988] 1 SCR 30. 
115. [1997] 3 SCR 925 [DFG].
116. Roxanne Mykitiuk & Dayna Nadine Scott, “Risky Pregnancy: Liability, 
Blame, and Insurance in the Governance of Prenatal Harm” (2010) 43:2 
UBC L Rev 311 at 331.
117. See e.g. Melanie Randall, “Pregnant Embodiment and Women’s 
Autonomy Rights in Law: An Analysis of the Language and Politics of 
Winnipeg Child and Family Services v. D.F.G.” (1999) 62:2 Sask L Rev 
515; Sandra Rodgers, “Winnipeg Child and Family Services v. D.F.G.: 
Juridical Interference with Pregnant Women in the Alleged Interest of 
the Fetus” (1998) 36:3 Alta L Rev 711; FC DeCoste, “Winnipeg Child 
and Family Services (Northwest Area) v. D.F.G.: Th e Impossibility of 
Fetal Rights and the Obligations of Judicial Governance” (1998) 36:3 
Alta L Rev 725; Laura Shanner, “Pregnancy Intervention and Models of 
Maternal-Fetal Relationship: Philosophical Refl ections on the Winnipeg 
C.F.S. Dissent” (1998) 36:3 Alta L Rev 751; Bruce P Elman & Jill Mason, 
“Th e Failure of Dialogue: Winnipeg Child and Family Services (Northwest 
Area) v. G. (D.F.)” (1998) 36:3 Alta L Rev 768; Timothy Caulfi eld & Erin 
Nelson, “Winnipeg Child and Family Services (Northwest Area) v DFG: 
A Commentary on the Law, Reproductive Autonomy and the Allure of 
Technopolicy” (1998) 36:3 Alta L Rev 799; Emilia Ordolis, “Maternal 
Substance Abuse and the Limits of Law: A Relational Challenge” (2008) 
46:1 Alta L Rev 119; Lorna Weir, Pregnancy, Risk and Biopolitics: On the 
Th reshold of the Living Subject (London, UK: Routledge, 2006) at 164; 
Mykitiuk & Scott, ibid at 332. 
118. DFG, supra note 115 at para 1.
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the Supreme Court of Canada were whether such an order could be 
permitted through tort law or through the power of the court to protect 
children (“parens patriae jurisdiction”).119 Th e majority judgment of Chief 
Justice McLachlin (as she then was) held that making the major changes 
to tort law required to support the order was best left to the legislature.120 
Granting legal rights to a fetus could allow the fetus to bring a variety of 
causes of action, including seeking an injunction preventing a pregnant 
woman from having an abortion.121 Th e Court would also be required to 
conceive of the unborn child and its mother “as separate juristic persons in 
a mutually separable and antagonistic relation,” a position that contrasts 
both the physical reality and the traditional legal characterization of the 
relationship.122 In addition, pregnant women’s lifestyle choices would be 
open to outside scrutiny123 and legal action124 which could in turn lead 
to a “confl ict between the pregnant woman as an autonomous decision-
maker and her fetus.”125 Th e Court was also concerned that restricting 
women’s behaviours in pregnancy might lead to women engaging in risky 
activities to avoid medical care.126 Th e judgment went on to hold that an 
119. Ibid at para 9.
120. Ibid at para 20.
121. Ibid at para 24. Th is had been unsuccessfully attempted in an earlier case 
that went before the Supreme Court of Canada. See Tremblay v Daigle, 
[1989] 2 SCR 530. As the formalistic analysis of whether the fetus is a 
person at law undertaken in that case is subsumed by the broader analysis 
in DFG, we do not analyze that case in detail.
122. DFG, ibid at para 29.
123. Ibid at para 42.
124. Ibid at paras 30-45.
125. Ibid at para 37.
126. Th e dissenting judgment of Justice Major (joined by Justice Sopinka), 
supported itself with information submitted by various interveners 
before the Court “on the prevalence of mental and physical disabilities 
in children as a result of substance abuse by their mothers while 
pregnant,” including “evidence focused on the ‘crisis situation’ in many 
aboriginal communities.” In concluding that Canadian law does support 
a remedy for the claim, Major J’s points include that the born alive rule 
originated as an evidentiary presumption that responded to limited 
medical knowledge of whether a child in utero was in fact alive at the 
time it allegedly suff ered injury. As such, present medical technologies 
such as ultrasound and fetal heart monitors render the rule “outdated 
and indefensible.” With respect to concerns over women’s autonomy, 
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injunction cannot support an order for detention,127 and that the power 
of parens patriae does not apply to the unborn.128 
Two years later, the Court would apply the broad framework 
established in DFG – that pregnant women cannot be found liable for 
behaviours that might harm their fetus – to a very diff erent fact scenario, 
with a slightly diff erent focus. Th e controversial129 case of Dobson 
(Litigation Guardian of ) v Dobs on130 raised the question of whether a child 
could sue his or her mother for injuries sustained while in utero in a motor 
vehicle accident as a result of her negligent driving. Th e infant plaintiff  
Ryan Dobson was delivered prematurely by caesarean section following 
the accident and was subsequently found to have “permanent mental and 
physical impairment, including cerebral palsy.”131 Th e majority judgment 
written by Justice Cory noted that the pregnant woman, in addition to 
fulfi lling an important role benefi ting society as a whole,132 “is also an 
individual whose bodily integrity, privacy and autonomy rights must be 
protected.”133 From this perspective, a pregnant woman is fundamentally 
diff erent than other defendants insofar as imposing a legal duty to protect 
the dissent states that the test for justifying confi nement is set at a “very 
high threshold.” Th at is, “[i]t is only in those extreme cases, where the 
conduct of the mother has a reasonable probability of causing serious and 
irreparable harm to the unborn child, and no other reasonable means of 
treatment exists, that a court should assume jurisdiction to intervene.” 
Ibid at paras 88, 109, 124, 136.
127. Ibid at para 46.
128. Ibid at paras 49-57.
129. See e.g. Ian R Kerr, “Pregnant Women and the ‘Born Alive’ Rule in 
Canada” (2000) 8:1 Tort Law Review 713; Diana Ginn, “A Balancing 
that is Beyond the Scope of the Common Law: A Discussion of the Issues 
Raised by Dobson (Litigation guardian of ) v. Dobson” (2001) 27:1 Queen’s 
LJ 51; Kristin Ali, “Defi ning the Standard of Prenatal Care: An Analysis 
of Judicial and Legislative Responses” (2007) 1:1 McGill JL & Health 
69; Diana Ginn, “Th e Supreme Court of Canada and What It Means 
to Be ‘Of Woman Born’” in Andrea O’Reilly, ed, From Motherhood to 
Mothering: Th e Legacy of Adrienne Rich’s Of Woman Born (Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 2004) 27; Weir, supra note 117 at 88; 
Mykitiuk & Scott, supra note 116 at 333.
130. [1999] 2 SCR 753 [Dobson].
131. Ibid at para 2.
132. Ibid at paras 24, 45.
133. Ibid at para 24.
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the life of a fetus could “render the most mundane decision taken in the 
course of her daily life as a pregnant woman subject to the scrutiny of the 
courts,”134 infringing substantially on women’s autonomy and privacy.135 
Th ese eff ects would also result from attempting to articulate the standard 
of conduct of a “reasonable pregnant woman.”136 Cory J concluded that 
public policy concerns indicated that a duty could not be imposed on 
pregnant women toward their fetus or subsequently born child, and 
remarked that provincial legislatures could create legislation to allow for 
insurance provisions to benefi t “both the injured child and his or her 
family, without unduly restricting the privacy and autonomy rights of 
women.”137 
Th e outcome of Dobson was a reiteration and expansion of the 
principle established in DFG, namely that attempts to restrict women’s 
behaviours in pregnancy through torts (prior to or once the child is born 
alive) are untenable, given the infringement on women’s reproductive 
autonomy and the problematic nature of diff erentiating acceptable and 
“reasonable” activities from those which might be restricted.138 Dobson 
makes clear that women’s bodily integrity and reproductive autonomy 
covers all actions that they may take throughout their pregnancy. Other 
cases have applied this principle to tort claims against mothers for harms 
incurred in utero139 and similar logic has been used in criminal cases.140 
134. Ibid at para 27.
135. Ibid at para 44.
136. Ibid at paras 52-53.
137. Ibid at para 81. Partly as a result of the decision, the province of Alberta 
enacted legislation to grant the precise cause of action denied in the 
case. Th e Maternal Tort Liability Act, SA 2005, c M-7.5, reads, in part, 
“a mother may be liable to her child for injuries suff ered by her child on 
or after birth that were caused by the mother’s use or operation of an 
automobile during her pregnancy,” and limits liability to “the amount 
of insurance money payable under contracts of automobile insurance 
indemnifying the mother that the child can recover as a creditor under 
s 635 of the Insurance Act.” See ss 1-4. See also Mykitiuk & Scott, supra 
note 116 at 339.
138. Ibid at para 52-53.
139. For the application of the principle in Dobson, see for example Hall 
(Litigaiton guardian of ) v Kellar, 23 CCLT (3d) 40 (Sup Ct).
140. See e.g. R v Drummond, [1997] OJ No 6390 (QL) (Ct J (Prov Div)), 
which involved a charge of attempted murder against a pregnant woman 
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Furthermore, Dobson elucidates that while pregnant women are not liable 
for injuries sustained by a fetus during pregnancy, this does not preclude 
the actions of other defendants. Parties other than the pregnant woman 
are liable for damages incurred by the fetus when the child is born alive, 
even if the injury is sustained prior to birth.
Overall, the claims of prenatal reproductive injury made in the 
aforementioned cases demonstrate that there has been hesitation 
on the part of Canadian courts to intervene in cases where claims of 
prenatal harm are made by children against their mothers, due to policy 
considerations related to women’s reproductive autonomy.141 Rather than 
identify fetal harm as separate from the maternal body, this approach 
supports the understanding that the fetus exists within the woman’s body 
and that, consequently, their relationship cannot be adversarial142 as the 
interests of the fetus and the pregnant woman are inherently inseparable. 
Th e judgements in DFG and Dobson recognized that imposing a duty 
for women to protect a fetus through the regulation of her behaviours 
would mean imposing a duty on her to treat her body, herself, in ways 
determined by the Court. 
Th e maternal exception in cases of prenatal harm recognized 
in Canadian jurisprudence has particular implications for the case 
of exposures to household chemicals. One of the risks of engaging 
in litigation addressing toxic exposures is that the responsibility for 
mitigating those exposures increasingly falls to women managing 
their households, purchasing household supplies, and engaging in 
precautionary consumption. Th e possibility of reproductive torts which 
can address exposures may implicate manufacturers of these chemicals, or 
their distributors, but they may also occur on an individualized basis, in 
for inserting a pellet gun into her vagina and shooting her fetus. It was 
apparent that charging women for homicide of the fetus or subsequently 
born alive child raises the spectre of the slippery slope of prosecuting 
women for substance abuse or a range of lawful behaviour. Th is would 
invite the same type of scrutiny of the conduct of pregnant women and 
interference with autonomy to which the Supreme Court of Canada in 
DFG and Dobson referred in justifying the refusal to recognize the tort 
duties in question.
141. BR v LR, 2004 ABQB 93 at para 35.
142. See Dobson, supra note 130 at para 72. 
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which women responsible for exposing their families to toxic household 
chemicals may be liable for the eff ects on their future children born 
alive. If women, and especially pregnant women, are counselled to avoid 
exposures by making smart decisions about what to eat, what to buy, and 
what to do, there is a potential duty of care that may be imparted onto 
women as they are increasingly expected to protect their families from 
the harms associated with chemical exposures. Women who fail to avoid 
cosmetics laden with phthalates, or who buy a used sofa leaching fl ame 
retardants, may one day be seen as negligent by failing to avoid known 
toxic substances and thereby exposing their child en ventre sa mère. 
Dobson and DFG, and the maternal exception in prenatal tort 
liability that they collectively establish, undermine the potential for such 
claims. Th ese cases off er important examples of the way that Canadian 
government institutions, namely the judiciary and legislature, have 
worked to advance women’s reproductive autonomy in pregnancy, 
particularly since the 1990s.143 Claims made against pregnant women or 
mothers for harms that occurred in utero are unlikely to garner success 
following Dobson, and off er some protection for women who do not or 
cannot engage in the laborious and expensive task of avoiding ubiquitous 
household chemicals. 
C.  Th e Birth of a Child as a Legal Harm (“Birth Torts”)
Th e tortious conduct in all of the above decisions was alleged to have 
caused physical harm144 to the fetus. Even though the fetus is not a legal 
person, once it is born alive tort law imagines how monetary compensation 
143. While the Supreme Court of Canada has advanced women’s reproductive 
autonomy in some cases, for some women, in many cases, “[w]hite 
supremacy, colonialism, oppression on the basis of class, (dis)ability, 
religion, language, sexual identity, and family status all combine with 
restrictions tied to both biological and social reproduction to circumscribe 
the lives of women and preclude their equality,” particularly in the 
judgments of the Court. Sanda Rogers, “Women’s Reproductive Equality 
and the Supreme Court of Canada” in Jocelyn Downie & Elaine Gibson, 
eds, Health Law At the Supreme Court of Canada (Toronto: Irwin Law, 
2007) 189 at 191. See also Elizabeth Comack, ed, Locating Law: Race/
Class/Gender/Sexuality Connections, 2d ed (Halifax, NS: Irwin Law, 2006).
144. Or a risk of physical injury, in the case of DFG.
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can put the plaintiff  back into his or her “original position” before he 
or she was injured. Th e “birth torts ,”145 a major class of reproductive 
tort, are distinguishable from the preceding prenatal injury cases in 
that rather than featuring negligence that physically changes the child, 
it causes the mother of the child to lose the opportunity to avoid or 
terminate an unwanted pregnancy. In other words, the birth of the child 
is itself the legal damage. Th e counterfactual original position is having 
avoided the unwanted pregnancy or birth. Th is notion of injury, and 
courts’ departures from it, poses conceptual and legal diffi  culties and 
has problematic social implications. Centrally, the notion of injury in 
the birth torts involves evaluating the legal signifi cance of the unwanted 
birth of a “healthy” or “normal” child versus the unwanted birth of a 
child with a disability. 
Birth tort cases can be broken into various broad categories which, 
though imperfec t,146 permit a view of the diff erent themes that emerge 
145. See Melinda Jones, “Valuing All Lives – Even ‘Wrongful’ Ones” in Marcia 
H Rioux, Lee Ann Basser & Melinda Jones, eds, Critical Perspectives on 
Human Rights and Disability Law (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff , 2011) 87 at 
87 [Jones, “Valuing All Lives”].
146. Th eorizing cases where the tortious act is the birth of a child has long 
been the subject of debate, particularly regarding the idea that life 
itself can be understood as a harm. Th e rejection of these categories 
has largely been premised on the assumption that birth or life can be 
conceptualized as a legal harm, and challenge the morality and capacity 
of the judiciary to assess whether a life is worth living. Th e categories 
of “wrongful pregnancy” (sometimes called “wrongful conception”) 
“wrongful birth” and “wrongful life” are used here for purposes of clarity, 
without intent to normalize or judge this categorization. See, for example, 
David Archard, “Wrongful Life” (2004) 79:309 Philosophy 403; Kelly 
E Rhinehart, “Debate over Wrongful Birth and Wrongful Life” (2002) 
26 Law & Psychol Rev 141; Jillian T Stein, “Backdoor Eugenics: Th e 
Troubling Implications of Certain Damages Awards in Wrongful Birth 
and Wrongful Life Claims” (2010) 40:3 Seton Hall L Rev 1117; Harvey 
Teff , “Th e Action for ‘Wrongful Life’ in England and the United States” 
(1985) 34:03 ICLQ 423; Stephen Todd, “Wrongful Conception, 
Wrongful Birth and Wrongful Life” (2005) 27:3 Sydney L Rev 525. It is 
also worth noting that “wrongful pregnancy” and “wrongful birth” as well 
as “wrongful birth” and “wrongful life” claims are not always distinguished 
from one another. See discussion in Bevilacqua v Altenkirk, 2004 BCSC 
945, at n 1 [Bevilacqua].
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within each. For heuristic purposes we divide birth torts into three 
categories, namely “wrongful pregnancy,” “wrongful birth,” and “wrongful 
life” claims. Wrongful pregnancy is claimed where a woman becomes 
pregnant despite not wanting a pregnancy, often resulting from a failed 
vasectom y;147 tubal ligatio n;148 incorrect advice stating that an individual 
is infertil e;149 a failed abortion attempt;150 or incorrect diagnosis that a 
woman is not pregnant.151 In these cases, the tort is the negligent failure 
of a health-care provider to prevent the conception or birth of a child 
when no child at all is wanted.152 
147. See e.g. McFarlane v Tayside Health Board, 1999 UKHL 50; Bevilacqua, 
ibid; Th ake v Maurice [1986] All ER 513 (QBD) [Th ake].
148. See e.g. Kealey v Berezowski (1996), 30 OR (3d) 37 (SC) [Kealey]; 
Parkinson v St James and Seacroft University Hospital NHS Trust, [2001] 
EWCA Civ 530; Rees v Darlington Memorial NHS Trust, [2003] UKHL 
52; S(M) v Baker, 2001 ABQB 1032; Suite c Cooke, [1995] RJQ 2765 
(CA) [Suite].
149. See e.g. Cattanach v Melchior, [2003] HCA 38 [Cattanach].
150. See e.g. Fredette v Wiebe (1986), 29 DLR (4th) 534 (BCSC); Roe v Dabbs, 
2004 BCSC 957.
151. See e.g. RKP v Borkent, 2005 ABQB 42 (claim failed for lack of breach of 
the standard of care). 
152. Th ere have been a number of diff erent approaches in the common law 
as to how to award damages where a healthy child is born. One such 
approach is awarding no damages in holding that the birth of a healthy 
child is not an injury recognized by the law, though this approach is rare 
and currently only taken in Nevada. See e.g. Christensen v Th ornby, 255 
NW 620 (Minn Sup Ct 1934); Szekeres v Robinson, 715 P (2d) 1076 (Nev 
Sup Ct 1986) [Szekeres]; Dotson v Bernstein, 207 P (3d) 911 at 915 (Colo 
Ct App 2009), citing Szekeres. A second, more common approach is the 
“limited damages” approach, wherein courts award compensation only for 
the costs of the pregnancy, but not for child-rearing. See e.g. Cattanach, 
supra note 149 at 174. A third approach – the off set-benefi t approach – 
recognizes the costs of raising a healthy child as a “compensable loss” but 
reduces the award on the basis that having the child also brings benefi ts 
to the plaintiff s. Kealey, supra note 148 at para 41; Cataford v Moreau, 
[1978] CS 933 (Qc Sup Ct); Th ake, supra note 147 (interestingly, in this 
case child-rearing costs were awarded in a modest amount agreed by the 
parties, but damages relating to labour and delivery was found to have 
been completely off set by the benefi ts of having the child); Suite, supra 
note 148; Troppi v Scarf, 187 NW (2d) 511(Mich Ct App 1971). Courts 
have, in some cases, found that the benefi ts may or may not completely 
cancel out the burdens. Under a fourth approach, the “total recovery” 
approach, courts award compensation for all the reasonably foreseeable 
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Wrongful birth claims involve claims brought by the parent(s) of a 
child with a disability against a health-care provider for negligent failure 
to provide the parent(s) the opportunity to avoid or terminate153 the 
pregnancy. Unlike wrongful pregnancy claims, in the case of wrongful 
birth a child is wanted, though not a child with a disability.  Th e fact 
scenarios which precipitate these claims vary, and include: negligent 
failure to off er an amniocentesis to a woman at risk of having a child 
with Down syndrom e;154 failure to properly diagnose or warn the 
mother about the risk to the fetus of contracting rubella during early 
pregnanc y;155 and negligent performance of or failure to warn about 
the results of an ultrasoun d.156 Th e negligence may also occur prior to 
conception, where it generally consists of inadequate genetic diagnosis 
or counselling regarding the likelihood of the parents conceiving and 
having a child with a genetic anomal y.157 Th e use of assisted reproductive 
damages resulting from the negligence, including the costs of raising 
the child. Decisions in which this approach has been adopted include 
Custodio v Bauer, 251 Cal App (2d) 303 (Cal Ct App 1967); Emeh v 
Kensington and Chelsea and Westminster Area Health Authority, [1984] 3 
All ER 1044 (CA) (though this case dealt with the birth of a child with a 
disability, the Court rejected the legal distinction in reaching its decision); 
Joshi (Guardian ad litem of ) v Woolley (1995), 4 BCLR (3d) 208 (SC).
153. See Kealey, supra note 148 at para 38; Nadia N Sawicki, “Wrongful 
Pregnancy, Wrongful Life and Wrongful Birth” (2005) 51:3 Medical Trial 
Technique Quarterly 283 at 284. 
154. See e.g. Jones (Guardian ad litem of ) v Rostvig, 2003 BCSC 1222 [Jones]; 
Krangle (Guardian ad lietem of ) v Brisco (1997), 154 DLR (4th) 707 (SC); 
Zhang v Kan, 2003 BCSC 5; Raina v Shaw, 2006 BCSC 832 (claim failed 
for failure to establish negligence).
155. See e.g. the American case of Gleitman v Cosgrove, 227 A (2d) 689 (NJ 
Sup Ct 1967). An English example is that of McKay v Essex Area Health 
Authority, [1982] QB 1166 (CA)[McKay]. Th e Canadian case of Arndt v 
Smith, [1994] 8 WWR 568 (SC) [Arndt], aff ’d [1997] 2 SCR 539, dealt 
with the analogous fact situation pertaining to maternal chickenpox.
156. McColl v Hudson, [1998] BCJ No 801 (QL) (SC); McDonald-Wright 
(Litigation Guardian of ) v O’Herlihy, 2007 ONCA 89, aff ’g, 75 OR 
(3d) 261 (SC); Mickle v Salvation Army Grace Hospital, Windsor Ontario 
(1998), 166 DLR (4th) 743 (Ont Ct J (Gen Div)) [Mickle]; Petkovic 
(Litigation Guardian of ) v Olupona, [2002] OTC 221 (Ont Sup Ct J (Div 
Ct))[Petkovic], leave to appeal to ONCA refused, 30 CCLT (3d) 266 (Sup 
Ct J (Div Ct)).
157. Bartok v Shokeir, [1999] 2 WWR 386 (QB) [Bartok], aff ’d (1998), 
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technologies can also lead to wrongful birth and wrongful life claims, for 
example through failure to screen for or avoid implantation of an embryo 
that will produce a child with a disability.158
Wrongful life claims are similar to those of wrongful birth, except 
that rather than parent(s) making the claim that they have been injured 
by negligence leading to pregnancy or a “wrongful birth,” an individual 
(usually a child) is arguing that his or her own birth is a harm.159 In such 
cases the plaintiff  argues that, but for the negligence of the defendant, his 
or her mother would have avoided or terminated her pregnancy and thus 
would have prevented his or her birth. Th ese claims are often brought 
based on practical considerations, namely that the time limitation period 
for children to bring an action in tort is usually signifi cantly longer than 
that for adults, and the parents may have missed the window in which 
they could bring their claim. Also, the anticipated award of damages to 
the child may be greater than that to the parents, since the child-rearing 
obligations of the parents generally cease when the child attains majority, 
yet the child when grown may still incur expenses relating to his or her 
conditio n.160 Th ese cases have been met with almost universal refusal 
among common law jurisdiction s.161
168 Sask R 280 (CA); Holowaychuk v Hodges, 2003 ABQB 201 
[Holowaychuk]; H(R) v Hunter (1996), 32 CCLT (2d) 44 (Ct J (Gen 
Div)).
158. See e.g. Waller v James, [2006] HCA 16; Johnson et al v Superior Court of 
Los Angeles County, 124 Cal (2d) 650 (Ct App 2002); Paretta v Medical 
Offi  ces for Human Reproduction, 760 NYS (2d) 639 (Sup Ct 2003).
159. See Kealey, supra note 148 at para 39.
160. Paxton v Ramji, 2008 ONCA 697 at para 80 [Paxton], aff ’g Paxton v 
Ramji (2006), 146 ACWS (3d) 913 (SC) [Paxton 2006]. 
161. Only one Canadian appellate court has addressed the validity of the 
claim, and refused to recognize it. See Lacroix (Litigation guardian of ) v 
Dominique, 2001 MBCA 122 [Lacroix], leave to appeal to SCC refused, 
2000 SCC A No 477. Th e superior courts in several provinces have 
refused to recognize the action either at trial or on motion to dismiss. See 
Arndt, supra note 155 at paras 16-28; Mickle, supra note 156 at para 11; 
Jones, supra note 154. In other instances, courts have refused motions to 
dismiss wrongful life claims, noting the unsettled nature of the area of 
law, and also that dismissal would not save time at trial as the remaining 
wrongful birth claim would cover many of the same issues. See Bartok, 
supra note 157; Holowaychuk, supra note 157; Sharma (Litigation guardian 
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Th ough wrongful pregnancy, wrongful birth, and wrongful life 
respond primarily to instances of medical malpractice, they may also 
address reproductive harms associated with exposures to household 
chemicals. If prenatal testing and screening develops to the point where 
the eff ects of household chemical exposures can be detected, it is not 
farfetched to anticipate that some women may base a decision about 
whether to maintain or terminate a pregnancy on this basis. In turn, 
medicine and law could normalize this practice through birth tort claims 
involving failure to detect and terminate a pregnancy where the child was 
born with a condition resulting from prenatal chemical exposure. Whether 
or not this contingency comes to pass, existing birth tort jurisprudence 
off ers important insights into some of the complexities of understanding 
disability as a legal harm. Both in birth torts and cases of exposure to, for 
example, BFRs and phthalates, a nuanced view of disability is necessary to 
limit the stigmatization of people with disabilities while simultaneously 
addressing the harms incurred through tortious action(s).
Commentators have taken diff erent positions with respect to whether 
wrongful birth and wrongful life claims should be permitted, primarily 
in relation to the way that such claims theorize disability. Some affi  rm the 
status quo of permitting wrongful birth but reject wrongful life claims,162 
while others argue that wrongful life actions too, should be allowe d.163 
of ) v Mergelas, [1997] OJ No 5304 (QL) (Ct J (Gen Div)) (unreported); 
Petkovic, supra note 156. Also, the common law of England, Australia, 
and most US states do not recognize the action. See McKay, supra note 
155.
162. See e.g. Penny Dimopoulos & Mirko Bagaric, “Th e Moral Status 
of Wrongful Life Claims” (2003) 32:1 C L World Rev 35; Penny 
Dimopoulos & Mirko Bagaric, “Why Wrongful Birth Actions are Right” 
(2003) 11:2 Journal of Law and Medicine 230.
163. See e.g. John Anthony Eaton, “Wrongful Life Claims: A Comparative 
Analysis” (2005) 35 Hong Kong LJ 671; Deana A Pollard, “Wrongful 
Analysis in Wrongful Life Jurisprudence” (2003) 55:2 Ala L Rev 327; 
Amos Shapira, ““Wrongful Life” Lawsuits for Faulty Genetic Counseling: 
Th e Impaired Newborn as a Plaintiff ” (1997) 13 Tel Aviv University 
Studies in Law 97; Dean Stretton, “Th e Birth Torts: Damages for 
Wrongful Birth and Wrongful Life” (2005) 10:1 Deakin Law Review 319; 
Mark Strasser, “Wrongful Life, Wrongful Birth, Wrongful Death, and the 
Right to Refuse Treatment: Can Reasonable Jurisdictions Recognize All 
But One” (1999) 64:1 Mo L Rev 29; Wendy F Hensel, “Th e Disabling 
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Th ough these commentators diff er in their particular rationales for 
recognizing the tort and in their visions of how courts ought to approach 
it, some ideas appear repeatedly. In reference to the concern that the law 
would devalue life by considering an impaired existence an injury vis-à-
vis death or non-existence, they assert that the law regularly makes this 
comparison in the area of refusal of medical treatment.164 Th ey also cite 
the right of abortion as reinforcing this conception of injury.165 As for the 
diffi  culty of conceptualizing and calculating damages in such cases, these 
commentators view the expenses associated with raising a child who has 
a disability and damages for pain and suff ering as straightforward heads 
of damage that further the interests of deterring medical malpractice and 
promoting distributive justice.166 In this way, commentators explicitly or 
implicitly treat the birth of the child with a disability as equivalent to the 
injury of a “healthy” child,167 or to the same eff ect, consider non-existence 
to possess the same quality of symmetry, equilibrium, or neutrality of 
being healthy and uninjured.168 Finally, they frame the award of damages 
as promoting respect for individuals with disabilities by enabling the 
acquisition of necessary care.169
Other commentators oppose the wrongful birth cause of action (and 
explicitly or implicitly the wrongful life cause of action as well).170 Among 
those opposed, some have focused on the impact of the tort on the rights 
of people living with disabilitie s.171 Wendy Hensel argues that wrongful 
Impact of Wrongful Birth and Wrongful Life Actions” (2005) 40:1 Harv 
CR-CLL Rev 141. See also Ronen Perry, “It’s a Wonderful Life” (2007) 
93:2 Cornell L Rev 329 at 329, regarding alternative mechanisms for 
recognizing the action of wrongful life as a breach of contract theory 
(rather than as a tort).
164. Eaton, ibid at 679; Pollard, ibid at 359-61; Stretton, ibid at 357; Strasser, 
ibid at 64, 75. 
165. Eaton, ibid at 692; Pollard, ibid at 330. 
166. Pollard, ibid at 338-42, 354; Shapira, supra note 163 at 100-01.
167. Shapira, ibid at 105-07.
168. Stretton, supra note 163 at 356, 358-59; Strasser, supra note 163 at 63.
169. Shapira, supra note 163 at 103-04; Stretton, ibid at 362.
170. See e.g. R Lee Akazaki, “‘Wrongful Birth’: An Ironic Name for a Cause 
of Action in the Law of Medical Malpractice” (1999) 22:1 Advocates’ Q 
102.
171. See e.g. Hensel, supra note 163; Darpana M Sheth, “Better Off  Unborn? 
An Analysis of Wrongful Birth and Wrongful Life Claims under the 
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birth and wrongful life claims send a “demeaning and demoralizing” 
message to people with disabilities and society in general.172 Obtaining 
compensation requires plaintiff s to “openly disavow their self-worth 
and dignity,” as children or their mothers must testify that the pregnant 
woman would have had an abortion.173 Legal inquiry in turn focuses on 
the functional impairment of the child rather than the shared experience 
of the stigmatization of disability, or on the socially constructed nature 
of disability.174 As a result, “[a]ny benefi ts secured by individual litigants 
in court are thus taxed to the community of people with disabilities as a 
whole, placing at risk, in the drive for individual compensation, the gains 
secured by collective action and identity.”175 Th erefore, neither action 
should be recognized.176
Sensitive to the messages these claims send, yet maintaining that 
courts are unlikely to abandon them, Kerry Cooperman argues that 
the recommended approach to upholding parental autonomy while 
respecting individuals living with disabilities is to fashion remedies 
and write judgments in a manner sensitive to the nature of disabilit y.177 
Americans with Disabilities Act” (2006) 73:4 Tenn L Rev 641. 
172. Hensel, ibid at 164.
173. Ibid at 171-72.
174. Ibid at 144, 174-75.
175. Ibid at 144.
176. Ibid at 145. But see Jones, “Valuing All Lives”, supra note 145, arguing 
that human rights principles support recovery in wrongful life claims. 
Sheth builds on the arguments made by Hensel in describing how 
wrongful birth and wrongful life claims violate the Americans with 
Disabilities Act, 42 USC 12101 (1990). See Sheth, supra note 171. 
Interestingly, at least one scholar has put forth a detailed argument 
focusing on human rights principles, in particular that of human dignity, 
in an attempt to support recovery in wrongful life claims. Jones considers 
that an award of damages recognizing a wrong promotes dignity. She 
conceives of the harm in wrongful life through comparing the position of 
the disabled child with that of a healthy child, as the latter is the child the 
mother believed she was carrying. She states that the main problem with 
the tort is its name, which denotes a focus on the “victim” rather than on 
the wrongful conduct of the defendant. Ideally a universal welfare scheme 
would provide for the needs of all disabled individuals, rather than a tort 
system off ering compensation only to those who can make out a cause of 
action. 
177. Kerry T Cooperman, “Th e Handicapping Eff ect of Judicial Opinions in 
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Cooperman supports the approach taken in Procanik v Cill o,178 the 
New Jersey wrongful life decision accepting the claim for damages 
associated with the costs of living with a disability but not for general 
damages covering pain and suff ering. Such an approach, he writes, avoids 
viewing being born disabled as a harm, instead favouring a “contextual 
jurisprudence that accounts for the social, fi nancial, and moral concerns 
of families, people with disabilities, and communities.”179 In particular, 
it focuses on the “needs of the living” rather than on the preference of 
non-life over life.180 
Th ese analyses of the birth torts off er a ready critique of notions of 
reproductive harm where they involve negligence that leads to the birth 
of a child living with a disability. Th e birth tort cases stand in contrast 
to conventional prenatal injury claims where the negligence caused the 
injury of a child who otherwise would have been born “healthy.” Such 
situations raise diffi  cult questions about the nature of harm or injury. 
For example, an emphasis on the prevention of disability, which tort law 
promotes through its deterrence function, risks portraying individuals 
with disabilities in a stigmatizing manner.181 In contrast, tort law may have 
diffi  culty recognizing that an injury has taken place in situations where 
some of the parties concerned do not feel aggrieved or “wounded.”182 
Decisions in the birth torts ought to avoid the dichotomy of viewing a 
healthy child as a blessing versus a child with a disability as a harm, and 
evaluate damages in terms of a nuanced view of disability taking into 
account “biological, familial, fi nancial, attitudinal, and social factors.”183 
Reducing stigma against individuals living with disabilities depends on 
Reproductive Tort Cases: Correcting the Legal Perception of Persons with 
Disabilities” (2008) 68 Md L Rev Endnotes 1 at 14-15.
178. 478 A (2d) 755 (NJ Sup Ct 1984) [Procanik].
179. Cooperman, supra note 177 at 19.
180. Ibid at 18, citing Procanik, supra note 178. See also Stein, supra note 146.
181. See Caroline Wang, “Culture, Meaning and Disability: Injury Prevention 
Campaigns and the Production of Stigma” (1992) 35:9 Social Science & 
Medicine 1093.
182. See Sarah S Lochlann Jain, Injury: Th e Politics of Product Design and Safety 
Law in the United States (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006) 
at 6.
183. Cooperman, supra note 177 at 18.
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careful characterization of injury, particularly in wrongful birth and 
wrongful life claims. 
Th ough not a matter of medical malpractice, and therefore currently 
outside of the framework of “birth torts,” cases in which household 
chemicals are linked to adverse health outcomes will similarly need to 
strike a balance between openness to change in the human form and 
acknowledging the blameworthiness of wrongdoers. However, the 
consideration of being born with a disability as a harm or injury is 
important to claims linked to exposure to toxic household chemicals. 
To this end, successful birth torts affi  rm that causing fetal harm through 
negligence in pregnancy is a legitimate site for legal action when the 
negligence results in the birth of a child with a disability. If exposures 
to household chemicals can be understood as a matter of negligence (i.e. 
a failure to warn consumers of the potential eff ects of exposure during 
pregnancy), it stands to reason that the principles of wrongful birth 
claims may be extracted for application in factual scenarios addressing 
prenatal exposures to household chemicals.  
D.  Pre-Conception Torts
Th e third unique set of circumstances in reproductive tort involves claims 
of negligence that occurred not simply prior to the birth of the child, 
but prior to his or her conception. Pre-conception torts generally involve 
negligence that occurs prior to conception and injury that occurs in utero. 
Th e injury may also be alleged to have occurred prior to conception. 
Th is situation can arise if gametes sustain damage prior to in vitro 
fertilization,184 or if radiation or toxic substances infl uence the germ-line 
cells of an individual who later has a child.185 
184. See for example, Evi ML Petro et al, “Endocrine-disrupting Chemicals 
in Human Follicular Fluid Impair In Vitro Oocyte Developmental 
Competence” (2012) 27:4 Human Reproduction 1025; Victor Y 
Fujimoto et al, “Serum Unconjugated Bisphenol A Concentrations 
in Women May Adversely Infl uence Oocyte Quality During In Vitro 
Fertilization” (2011) 95:5 Fertility and Sterility 1816.
185. See for example, Susan M Duty et al, “Th e Relationship Between 
Environmental Exposures to Phthalates and DNA Damage in Human 
Sperm Using the Neutral Comet Assay” (2003) 111:9 Environmental 
Health Perspectives 1164; Russ Hauser, “Urinary Phthalate Metabolites 
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Canadian courts have not explicitly addressed the viability of pre-
conception tort claims. An overview of the American case law that has 
dealt with the issue is helpful. On surveying the jurisprudence, one fi nds 
that the prospect of recovery varies by fact scenario and by state. Th e 
most successful cause of action has been that of a child injured as a result 
of failure of the mother’s physician to treat her against Rh sensitization 
following the birth of a prior child with incompatible Rh factor bloo d.186 
A standard and straightforward treatment, its omission can lead to serious 
illness or stillbirth of a subsequently conceived child with incompatible 
Rh factor blood.187 Courts in various states have allowed this type of 
claim, even where the injured child was not conceived until several years 
after the negligence occurre d.188 Th e state of New York, however, which 
has consistently denied preconception tort claims, refused to recognize 
this cause of action in a relatively recent decision.189
In contrast to the overall success of the above cause of action, no 
court has allowed a claim involving injury resulting from an automobile 
accident to a child that was not yet conceived at the time of the accident.190 
Th is example provides an illustration of how conception can serve as 
a dividing line with respect to duty. Recognizing the claim of a child 
in utero has been unproblematic in the automobile collision context. 
However, courts dealing with pre-conception claims have held that it 
is not foreseeable that a child would be injured as a result of a collision 
and Semen Quality: A Review of a Potential Biomarker of Susceptibility” 
(2008) 31:2 International Journal of Andrology 112.
186. Julie A Greenberg, “Reconceptualizing Preconception Torts” (1997) 64:2 
Tenn L Rev 315 at 336-37.
187. Karen Fung Kee Fung et al, “Prevention of Rh Alloimmunization” (2003) 
25:9 Journal of Obstetrics and Gynaecology Canada 765; Lough v Rolla 
Women’s Clinic, Inc, 866 SW (2d) 851 at 852 (Mo Sup Ct 1993).
188. Greenberg, supra note 186 at 323-26; Matthew Browne, “Preconception 
Tort Law in an Era of Assisted Reproduction: Applying a Nexus Test for 
Duty” (2001) 69:6 Fordham L Rev 2555 at 2567-72. As a variation on 
the facts of the majority of cases cited involving Rh sensitization, the 
successful 1967 preconception tort case of Renslow v Mennonite Hospital, 
367 NE (2d) 1250 (Ill Sup Ct 1977) [Renslow], involved the negligent 
transfusion of Rh positive blood to an Rh negative woman who became 
sensitized and later conceived and gave birth to a child harmed as a result.
189. Barakov v Beth Israel Med Ctr, 44 AD (3d) 981 (NY App Div 2007).
190. Browne, supra note 188 at 2578.
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involving a woman who was not yet pregnant at the time.191 
Less consistent in terms of outcome are cases centring on surgery 
and other medical treatment, products including pharmaceuticals, and 
exposure to toxic substances (usually in an employment context).192 
Successful surgery actions have taken place in Michigan193 and Missouri.194 
Both actions involved a subsequently conceived child injured by negligent 
performance of a caesarean section during the birth of a prior child. 
Th e case of Albala v City of New York195 similarly involved the negligent 
performance of an abortion that led to the injury of a child subsequently 
conceived. In that case, the New York Court of Appeals held that to allow 
the proposed cause of action would “require the extension of traditional 
tort concepts beyond manageable bounds.”196 Th e Court also noted 
that the proposed duty would encourage doctors to practice defensive 
medicine, and that “society as a whole would bear the cost of our placing 
physicians in a direct confl ict between their moral duty to patients and 
the proposed legal duty to those hypothetical future generations outside 
the immediate zone of danger.”197
With respect to products liability, recovery has been sparse. Th ough 
one court refused to dismiss a claim alleging injury to children conceived 
and born subsequent to their mother’s taking birth control pills,198 most 
pre-conception actions involving pharmaceuticals have been unsuccessful 
claims by grandchildren of women who took DES during pregnanc y.199 
As noted above, women exposed to DES in utero had an array of 
191. McAuley v Wills, 303 SE (2d) 258 (Ga Sup Ct 1983).
192. Browne, supra note 188 at 2555 ff .
193. Martin v St John Hospital and Medical Center, 517 NW (2d) 787 (Mich 
Ct App 1994).
194. Bergstreser v Mitchell, 577 F (2d) 22 (8th Cir 1978).
195. 54 NY (2d) 269 (Ct App 1981).
196. Ibid at 271-72.
197. Ibid at 274.
198. Jorgensen v Meade, 483 F (2d) 237 (10th Cir 1973).
199. Th e lack of success in DES claims has been attributed in part to the long 
latency period between exposure and the discovery of reproductive harm 
in DES granddaughters. See Glen O Robinson, “Multiple Causation in 
Tort Law: Refl ections on the DES Cases” (1982) 68:4 Va L Rev 713. See 
also discussion of diffi  culty identifying a plaintiff  in multigenerational 
DES cases below at note 272 and accompanying text.
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adverse health outcomes including uterine anomalies that impeded their 
capacity to carry a pregnancy to term. As a result, some of their children 
suff ered injury due to premature birth. In one such claim – Enright v 
Eli Lilly (which involved claims made by a “DES granddaughter” born 
with cerebral palsy) – the New York Court of Appeals held that the 
principles expressed in Albala applied, as recognizing liability could lead 
to over-deterrence and a disincentive for drug manufacturers to produce 
generally useful products.200 Th e Court also worried that recognizing a 
duty here would lead to claims for damages by subsequent generations 
of plaintiff s.201  
Several decisions suggest that some jurisdictions may recognize a 
duty to plaintiff s not yet conceived in workplace and other exposure 
scenarios, though having to satisfy every element of the relevant cause 
of action, including causation, has limited recover y.202 Th e United States 
Supreme Court in International Union, UAW v Johnson Controls203 
referred in passing to the possibility of pre-conception tort liability. 
In the decision, the Court held that an employer measure prohibiting 
women of childbearing capacity from participating in work activities 
where they would be exposed to lead, a teratogen, impermissibly 
discriminated against women and was not accepted as a bona fi de 
occupational qualifi cation (BFOQ). Th e majority found the prospect 
of tort liability to injured infants to be remote.204 Th ey based this 
conclusion on the facts that the employer was informing women of the 
risks associated with lead exposure and complying with Occupational 
Safety and Health Administration standards concerning such exposure, 
and that federal anti-discrimination law would pre-empt state tort law if 
it were impossible to comply with both.205 Th e concurring judgment of 
200. 77 NY (2d) 377 at 386-87 (Ct App 1991).
201. Ibid at 387.
202. See e.g. Coley v Commonwealth Edison Co, 768 F Supp 625 (Ill Dist 
Ct 1991); Second Nat’l Bank v Sears, Roebuck & Co, 390 NE (2d) 229 
(Ind Ct App 1979). See also Daniel S Goldberg, “Against Genetic 
Exceptionalism: An Argument in Favor of the Viability of Preconception 
Genetic Torts” (2007) 10:2 J Health Care L & Pol’y 259. 
203. 499 US 187 (US 1991) [Johnson Controls].
204. Ibid at 208.
205. Ibid at 208-09.
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Justice Scalia similarly states that, as the employer has not demonstrated 
“a substantial risk of tort liability,” the argument that its fetal protection 
policy is a BFOQ is necessarily defeated.206 In contrast, Justice White, 
though concurring in the result, emphasized that given the increasing 
recognition of pre-conception tort,207 a fetal protection policy could be 
justifi ed if an employer could establish that it was “reasonably necessary 
to avoid substantial tort liability.”208 
Perhaps most relevant to the case of exposure to household chemicals 
is a more recent American pre-conception tort case in which the District 
Court for the Northern District of California decided a case involving 
alleged genetic damage and injury due to toxic environmental emissions. 
Th e Court held with respect to the pre-conception claims that the 
defendant emitter did not owe a duty to the plaintiff s as it did not provide 
“goods or services related to the reproductive process .”209 Following the 
precedent set in a California pre-conception automobile injury cas e,210 the 
Court held that the alleged injuries were not reasonably foreseeable. Th e 
Court suggested that the law may change when “science and medicine 
progress to the point that scientists can interpret individual DNA 
histories or can confi dently attribute injuries to chemical exposure.”211
Despite the suggestion of the District Court for the Northern District 
of California regarding the potential for future claims in which injuries can 
be clearly attributed to chemical exposures, and the increased recognition 
of preconception torts outlined in Johnson Controls, the challenge posed 
by the lack of concrete evidence of intergenerational reproductive harm 
in the case of household chemicals is, as yet, a particularly diffi  cult legal 
obstacle to overcome. Yet, it is pre-conception injury scenarios that may 
be most useful to theorizing intergenerational reproductive harm that 
may be caused by exposure to household chemicals. Pre-conception 
injury scenarios by their nature raise concern over liability for harm 
206. Ibid at 223-24.
207. Ibid at 213.
208. Ibid at 212-13.
209. Avila v Remco Hydraulics, 633 F (3d) 828 at 848 (9th Circ 2011).
210. Hegyes v Unjian, 234 Cal App (3d) 1103 at 1138 (Ct App 1991)[Hegyes].
211. Whitlock v Pepsi Americas, 681 F Supp (2d) 1123 at 1127 (Cal Dist Ct 
2010).
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to future generations. As such, they clearly implicate indeterminacy 
of liability in time and class, and by a function of these, together with 
the fact that damages for injuries to infants often amount to millions 
of dollars, indeterminacy in amount as well. American pre-conception 
tort judgments have noted the “staggering” implications of recognizing a 
duty: courts have referred to the prospect of liability to younger siblings 
of the plaintiff  child conceived and born to a woman previously injured 
in an automobile collision,212 or, in the case of a young woman who 
becomes sensitized to the Rh factor through blood transfused at a young 
age and whose child brings a claim upon reaching majority, liability to 
children in a proceeding taking place “half a century after the negligent 
act was performed.”213 Given the ubiquity of household chemicals, 
lack of knowledge about their health eff ects (particularly in terms of 
multigenerational eff ects and exposures in utero), and the diff use, often-
gradual nature of exposure, factual scenarios that will pertain to harm 
caused by BFRs and phthalates may often involve indeterminate liability. 
Courts and scholars attempting to allay concerns regarding the 
potential burden of indeterminate liability make several points. First, 
they assert that the actual number of pre-conception tort claims is and 
will be very small.214 Th is may not be persuasive in Canadian courts as 
indeterminate liability has been noted to be a concern over just that: 
indeterminacy, and not simply the volume of claim s.215 Next, concern 
over indeterminate liability has been addressed by distinguishing certain 
injuries from “self-perpetuating” conditions such as exposure to chemicals 
or radiation resulting in germ-line genetic changes.216 Any indeterminacy 
would be far less pronounced if liability only extends to individuals in 
a single generation. Th is approach, however, distinguishes rather than 
212. Hegyes, supra note 210 at 1119. 
213. Renslow, supra note 188 at 376 (quoted from the dissenting judgment).
214. Hegyes, supra note 210 at 1151-52 (dissenting judgment); Goldberg supra 
note 202 (referring to “the problem of multi-generational liability” as “the 
proverbial storm in a teacup” at 282), and citing Greenberg, supra note 
186. 
215. See e.g. Canadian National Railway Co v Norsk Pacifi c Steamship Co, 
[1992] 1 SCR 1021 at 1126-27 [Norsk].
216. See e.g. Hegyes, supra note 210 at 1146 (dissenting judgment); Renslow, 
supra note 188 at 358.
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resolves the issue of transgenerational harm. To this latter end, some 
advocate employing a case-by-case analysis of what essentially amounts 
to foreseeability and proximity, rather than categorically denying any pre-
conception duty.217 Others propose drawing the line at allowing recovery 
only for fi rst generation pre-conception claimants.218 In Canadian law, 
suffi  cient proximity may address concerns over indeterminate liability.219 
As precedent in pre-conception tort is limited, it is not possible 
to confi dently predict how Canadian courts will resolve the issues 
of foreseeability, proximity, and the residual policy consideration of 
indeterminate liability, and further, how they might do so in a factual 
scenario involving exposures to household chemicals. Given the holdings 
in Bovingdon v Hergo tt220 and Paxton,221 it is probable that courts in 
Ontario, if not Canada as a whole, will take a conservative approach, 
not recognizing all of the pre-conception causes of action that have been 
successful in the US. Th is will make recovery diffi  cult where household 
chemicals result in injuries, reproductive or otherwise, for a child yet-to-
be-conceived. 
IV.  Rethinking the Categorization of “Reproductive  
 Torts” 
Th ere are a number of Canadian cases which do not fi t neatly into the 
aforementioned scheme, and which have ultimately motivated courts to 
rethink their approach to reproductive tort. Th ese cases simultaneously 
consider some combination of prenatal injury, birth torts, and 
217. See Tracey I Batt, “DES Th ird-Generation Liability: A Proximate Cause” 
(1996) 18:3 Cardozo L Rev 1217 at 1232.  Granted, this is a somewhat 
circular argument in that it does not explain what factors would lead 
to a fi nding of foreseeability and proximity or address concerns over 
indeterminate liability; however, it does argue against a blanket no-duty 
rule for preconception claims.
218. See the dissenting judgment in Grover v Eli Lilly & Co, 63 Ohio St (3d) 
756 at para 766 (Ohio Sup Ct 1992).
219. See Norsk, supra note 215 at para 258, but see contra the minority 
concurring judgment at para 321.
220. (2006), 83 OR (3d) 465 (Sup Ct), aff ’d 2008 ONCA 2 [Bovingdon 2008]. 
221. Paxton, supra note 160. See also Liebig v Guelph General Hospital, 2009 
CanLII 56297 (Ont Sup Ct).
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preconception injury with varying outcomes. Taken together, these cases 
suggest a shift away from categorical classifi cation of reproductive tort, 
and towards determining the legitimacy of prenatal and preconception 
claims drawing on the two-stage Anns tes t.222 As discussed below, this 
approach at once promotes the recognition of women’s autonomy by 
providing a means to balance the duty of care against relevant policy 
considerations, while establishing a need for a clear and direct relationship 
between the tortfeasor and plaintiff  through foreseeability and proximity 
in duty of care.  
Th e 1992 decision of the British Columbia Court of Appeal in Cherry 
(Guardian ad litem of ) v Borsman223 concerned facts that resembled both 
prenatal injury and wrongful life situations. Th e adult plaintiff , while 
pregnant, was the patient of the defendant who performed an abortion 
procedure on her, which failed. Th e infant plaintiff  alleged that negligent 
performance of the procedure itself caused her to be born with a severe 
disability. At trial the defendant was found liable to both plaintiff s. 
One of the key issues on appeal was whether the trial judge erred in 
holding that the defendant owed a duty to the fetus not to harm it while 
performing an abortion procedure at the request of the adult plaintiff . 
Th e Court held that this was not a wrongful life case, as the defendant 
argued. Agreeing with the trial judge and with the infant plaintiff , the 
court noted that wrongful life cases are characterized by an assertion of 
“a legal obligation to the foetus to terminate its life,”224 while the case in 
question involved an infant plaintiff  physically injured by the defendant’s 
negligence. Th is supported a cause of action as the defendant owed a 
duty to the mother to properly perform the procedure, as well as to the 
subsequently born child not to harm it if he failed in carrying out his 
duty to the mother. Th us, though in actual fact the child would not have 
been born but for the negligence, the court aff orded the child a remedy 
by defi ning the claim through the duty not to injure.
In another case, Lacroix v Dominique,225 the Manitoba Court of 
222. Anns v Merton London Borough Council, [1977] All ER 118 [Anns].
223. 94 DLR (4th) 487 (BCCA) [Cherry], aff ’g (1990), 75 DLR (4th) 668 
(BCSC).
224. Ibid at para 71.
225. Supra note 161.
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Appeal was also faced with a factual scenario in which it was unclear 
whether the injury was harm to the child en ventre sa mère, or a wrongful 
life claim. Th e plaintiff  parents consulted the defendant neurologist about 
whether the medication the mother was taking to control her epilepsy 
would pose risks to any children they would have while she was taking 
the medication. Th e parents alleged, and the trial judge found, that the 
defendant had not properly advised the plaintiff  parents of the risks. 
Th eir second child, the infant plaintiff  Donna, “was born with physical 
anomalies and was diagnosed as being developmentally delayed and 
retarded.”226 Th e trial judge had found that the cause of her disabilities 
was the medication, and that had the parents been properly advised the 
mother would not have become pregnant.227
In setting out its analysis concerning the child’s claim, the Court 
of Appeal stated, “[c]ases involving a claim by a child born with 
abnormalities generally fall within one of two categories: (1) cases 
in which the abnormalities have been caused by the wrongful act or 
omission of another; and (2) cases in which, but for the wrongful act or 
omission, the child would not have been born at all.”228 Th e Court cited 
Cherry as an example of a case falling under the fi rst category, noting the 
ultimate award of damages to the child.229 As for the second category, the 
court in Lacroix concluded that, based on the fact that the mother would 
not have become pregnant had she been properly advised, the case fell 
into the second category, and that the trial judge was therefore correct in 
rejecting the child’s claim.230
Th e 2008 decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal in Bovingdon 
responded to both Cherry and Lacroix. Th e case featured a woman 
who was prescribed Clomid to aid with ovulation, and who later gave 
birth to twins with disabilities. Th e plaintiff s alleged that the defendant 
obstetrician negligently failed to inform the mother of the risks associated 
with taking the drug, specifi cally the possibility of prematurely giving 
birth to twins, and of the risks associated with premature birth, including 
226. Ibid at para 5.
227. Ibid at para 8.
228. Ibid at para 24.
229. Ibid at para 25.
230. Ibid at para 42.
128 
 
Cattapan, Mykitiuk & Pioro, Notions of Reproductive Harm
cerebral palsy.231 At trial, the defendant was found to have owed a duty 
of care to the infant twin plaintiff s. Pardu J held, relying on Lacroix, that 
this was not a wrongful life case because the defendant, in prescribing 
Clomid, caused not only the birth of the children, but also their injury.232 
Th e defendant appealed.
Justice Feldman, in her judgment on behalf of the Court of Appeal, 
reviewed the two-category analysis set out in Lacroix, and rejected it as 
failing to provide “a coherent theory that can assist courts in making 
the diffi  cult decision of when a child should be able to recover damages 
from a doctor for being born with disabilities.”233 Th e trouble with the 
approach was that cases such as Cherry and Lacroix could be viewed as 
falling into either category, with the negligence capable of being viewed 
as causing both the injury as well as the birth of the child. She preferred 
to approach the claim “through the normal analysis of tort liability: duty 
of care, standard of care, breach, and damage.”234 With respect to the fi rst 
issue, the infant plaintiff s argued that the defendant owed them a duty 
co-extensive to that owed to their mother, namely, to properly inform 
her of the risks associated with taking the fertility drug Clomid.235 Th e 
plaintiff s further asserted, likely in order to avoid the characterization 
of their claim as one for wrongful life, that they had the right “to have a 
drug-free conception, with a reduced risk of disability, rather than a right 
not to be born.”236
Feldman JA held that because the defendant’s duty was to provide 
information to help the mother make the decision of whether or not to 
take the drug, it could not be said that the children had a right to a drug-
free birth. Neither could they be owed a duty co-extensive with that owed 
to the mother, since it is the mother’s choice whether to take the drug or 
not. She could, after all, have chosen to take the drug notwithstanding 
any risks to the children.237 Th e defendant therefore did not owe a duty 
231. Bovingdon 2008, supra note 220 at para 13.
232. Ibid at para 4.
233. Ibid at para 55.
234. Ibid at para 61.
235. Ibid at para 62.
236. Ibid.
237. Ibid at para 68.
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to the children not to cause them harm in prescribing Clomid to their 
mother.238 Policy considerations also supported this conclusion, in 
that recognizing the duty would create a potential confl ict: physicians 
might refuse to off er to prescribe Clomid to women for fear that doing 
so could breach a duty owed to their future children.239  Feldman JA 
indicated that in deciding the case at bar on the basis of duty, she was 
not commenting on the viability of the wrongful life cause of action.240 
She also distinguished the case at bar from the case where a child alleges 
that a physician negligently prescribed his or her mother a drug that is 
contraindicated for pregnant women.241
Later the same year, the Court took on this very issue in the 
case of Paxton v Ramji. In this case, Dawn Paxton had requested her 
physician, the defendant Dr. Ramji, to prescribe Accutane to treat her 
acne condition.242 As Accutane is a teratogen, as per the standard of 
care, specifi c precautions are supposed to be taken to ensure that the 
patient does not become pregnant while taking Accutane, namely the 
use of two forms of birth control (when the patient is not abstinent).243 
In prescribing the drug,244 Dr. Ramji relied on the fact that Ms. Paxton’s 
husband had undergone a vasectomy about 4 1/2 years prior to her 
commencing the treatment.245 Shortly after commencing treatment, 
however, Ms. Paxton became pregnant due to failure of the vasectomy.246 
As a result, Jaime Paxton was born “with a number of severe disabilities 
238. Ibid at para 70.
239. Ibid at para 71.
240. Ibid at para 72.
241. Ibid at para 69.
242. Paxton, supra note 160 at para 5.
243. Ibid at paras 6-7.
244. As Accutane is a teratogen, it was only supposed to be prescribed 
following the Pregnancy Protection Mainpro-C Program (PPP) developed 
by the drug’s manufacturer, which stipulates that the patient use eff ective 
contraception from one month prior to commencing treatment, until 
one month after ceasing treatment. Specifi cally, two reliable birth control 
methods were to be used simultaneously, unless abstinence was the chosen 
method (not merely a vasectomy as in Paxton). See ibid at paras 6-7; 
Paxton 2006, supra note 160 at para 136. 
245. Paxton, ibid at para 2.
246. Ibid at para 9.
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as a result of her exposure to Accutane while in utero, including a right 
facial palsy; seizures; generalized hypotonia; megalencephaly of the left 
occipital lobe of the brain; prominent dysmorphic features; hearing loss; 
anotia (absent right ear); and microtia (malformed left ear).”247 
Th e infant plaintiff  brought a claim in negligence against Dr. 
Ramji.248 At trial, Justice Eberhard held that a physician owes a duty 
to the “unconceived child of a woman of childbearing potential”249 
not to prescribe Accutane if it was contraindicated, specifi cally if the 
patient is of childbearing potential and the physician is not satisfi ed 
that she will avoid pregnancy while taking the drug.250 In arriving at this 
conclusion, Eberhard J fi rst turned to the classifi cation of causes of action 
in reproductive tort, considering the analysis in Lacroix as particularly 
persuasive.251 Viewing the duty as one not to prescribe the drug to a 
woman if she were unable or unwilling to follow the required birth 
control methods, she concluded that the duty was owed to the potential 
child of the patient (not to injure her/him).252 She acknowledged that 
“in the abstract” this duty gave rise to a concern about confl ict with the 
physician’s duty to his or her patient.253 However, “in the real world,” 
physicians already deal with this confl ict, as the standard of care imposed 
by the medical community “demands that protections must be put in 
place to avoid pregnancy before Accutane can be given.”254
Eberhard J distinguished the facts of the case at bar from those in 
Lacroix. As the medication in Lacroix was required for the mother’s health 
as well as for that of her future child, it was impossible to hold that the 
physician owed a duty to the future child in prescribing the drug.255 She 
also justifi ed holding that a duty of care could be owed in this case to a 
child before he or she was conceived. She noted that whether a woman 
is already pregnant or later becomes pregnant when prescribed Accutane, 
247. Ibid at para 11.
248. Ibid at paras 2, 17.
249. Ibid at para 22.
250. Paxton 2006, supra note 160.
251. Ibid at para 157.
252. Ibid at para 194.
253. Ibid at para 196.
254. Ibid.
255. Ibid at para 199.
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the risk and injury to the child may be the same and the pregnancy is 
equally “foreseeable and proximate.”256 Notwithstanding, having held 
that the defendant owed a duty to the infant plaintiff  not to prescribe 
Accutane to her mother if it was contraindicated, the trial judge found 
that Dr. Ramji had met the standard of care in relying on the vasectomy 
as an eff ective means of addressing Ms. Paxton’s child bearing potential. 
Th us, the prescription of Accutane was not contraindicated and the claim 
was dismissed.257
Th e plaintiff s appealed the trial judge’s fi ndings with respect to 
standard of care,258 while the defendants used the appeal to argue against 
the recognition of a duty of care to Jaime. Th e Court of Appeal disposed 
of the appeal by overturning the trial judge’s holding with respect to duty. 
Feldman JA, who wrote the decision, echoed her judgment in Bovingdon 
in criticizing the Lacroix approach of evaluating claims by determining 
whether or not they could be characterized as wrongful life.259 Instead, 
she referred to a line of tort cases decided by the Supreme Court of 
Canada, relating to various factual subject matters, which set out and 
apply the basic test for determining whether a duty of care should be 
recognized.260 To this end, the Court held that there was “no settled 
jurisprudence in Canada on the question whether a doctor can be in a 
proximate relationship with a future child who was not yet conceived or 
born at the time of the doctor’s impugned conduct,”261 nor was there an 
analogous duty of care.262 Feldman JA thus turned to the Anns test263 to 
fi rst establish whether the foreseeability and proximity of duty of care 
necessary to establish a prima facie duty of care exists, and then, if such 
a duty existed, to examine whether residual policy considerations should 
256. Ibid at para 206.
257. Ibid at paras 211-16.
258. Th ey also appealed a fi nding that Jaime would not be entitled to punitive 
damages.
259. Paxton, supra note 160 at paras 28-29. 
260. Ibid at para 29.
261. Ibid at para 53.
262. Ibid at para 54.
263. See ibid at paras 60-80, citing Anns, supra note 222 and subsequent 
Canadian jurisprudence.
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limit recognition of the duty.264  
Feldman JA found that, though the injury was foreseeable, the 
physician’s relationship with the child-yet-to-be-conceived was not 
proximate enough to recognize a duty. Imposing a duty of care for children 
not yet conceived could result in physicians off ering “treatment to some 
female patients in a way that might deprive them of their autonomy and 
freedom of informed choice in their medical care.”265 Citing the Supreme 
Court of Canada decisions in Dobson and DFG, Feldman JA stated that 
“[b]ecause women are autonomous decision makers with respect to their 
own bodies, they neither make the decision on behalf of the future child, 
nor do they owe a duty to act in the best interests of a future child.”266 
In the case of prescribing a teratogenic drug, the physician can only 
enlist the agreement of the woman not to become pregnant, but he or 
she cannot ensure that she will abide by that agreement.267 Feldman JA 
went on to state that residual policy considerations would likewise make 
imposition of a duty seem unwise.268 It could, for example, destabilize 
women’s right to abortion,269 presumably by promoting the view that the 
future child has its own legal interests apart from those of the mother. As 
a result of the holding with respect to duty, the appeal was dismissed.270
Th e Canadian case law covering reproductive tort cases involving 
multiple claims (i.e. a combination of prenatal injury, wrongful birth, 
wrongful life, and preconception claims), culminating in the decision 
in Paxton, signifi es a shift away from resolving disputes by determining 
whether they give rise to wrongful life claims, to approaching them using 
the ordinary principles of tort law. As noted above, this approach to 
reproductive tort law is particularly useful to address confl icting duties 
of care. In such cases, determining a duty of care relies on fi rst proximity 
and foreseeability (following the Anns test), balanced against specifi c 
264. Ibid at para 35, quoting Syl Apps Secure Treatment Centre v BD, 2007 SCC 
38 at para 3.
265. Ibid at para 68.
266. Ibid at para 73.
267. Ibid at paras 74-75.
268. Ibid at para 77.
269. Ibid at para 79.
270. Ibid at para 88.
133(2015) 1 CJCCL
policy considerations. 
Th e idea that a duty of care to a woman may preclude a duty of care 
to a fetus or preconceived embryo, following the policy considerations of 
the Anns test recognized in Paxton, is integral to upholding the principles 
of judicial non-intervention in the governance of pregnancy established 
in DFG and Dobson. Th e inseparability of a woman, a fetus, and her 
preconceived embryos is important here, and Paxton asserted that the 
unique nature of this relationship cannot require a duty of care.271 
Applied to the case of exposures to toxic household chemicals, this 
may mean that through the application of the Anns test, and the policy 
considerations emergent in DFG and Dobson, women, and in certain 
cases the physicians treating them, may not be liable for the exposure 
of either fetuses or preconceived embryos to exposures to household 
chemicals that may result in injury. 
Apart from the issues of proximity and foreseeability raised in 
the application of the Anns test to prenatal and preconception claims, 
recovery will be unlikely in cases where the harms incurred cannot be 
clearly and directly linked to a particular origin, or where cause-and-
eff ect in injury are unclear. For example, determining a duty of care for 
particular pharmaceutical companies has been diffi  cult as plaintiff s whose 
mothers took DES are often unable to determine the manufacturer of 
the drugs taken by their mothers decades ag o.272 Factual scenarios where 
individuals may be exposed to a wide array of household chemicals prior 
to conception, in utero, and/or in breastfeeding make it diffi  cult to discern 
when and how exposures took place, which chemicals are responsible 
for what physiological harms, and which manufacturers should be held 
liable. 
V.  Conclusion
Reproductive tort jurisprudence has a number of signifi cant implications 
for the litigation of injuries caused by prenatal and preconception 
exposure to household chemicals. Th e decisions in prenatal injury cases 
271. Ibid at para 68.
272. “Jury Awards $42.3 Million to Women in Drug Lawsuit”, Th e New York 
Times (9 January 1994) 28.
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(including Montreal Tramways and Duval) that do not include claims 
against a pregnant woman suggest that the cause of action for personal 
injury sustained while in utero is well-established. Th ough reproductive 
harms caused by household chemicals are, as noted above, most often the 
result of diff use, cumulative exposures, these cases identify the potential 
for such claims to succeed. Further, they remind us that causation need 
not be defi nitively proven, as long as the relationship between the harm 
done and the purported causation can be reasonably established on a 
balance of probabilities.
Canadian courts have, following DFG and Dobson, established a 
legal framework that demonstrates fl exibility in conceptualizing prenatal 
claims made against pregnant women.273 Recognizing the pre-eminence 
of the right to reproductive autonomy, the Supreme Court of Canada has 
refused to permit claims of prenatal harm brought by a child, once born, 
against his or her mother. In Paxton and Lacroix, the courts also refused 
to permit claims in cases of preconception injury insofar as claims against 
individuals who owe the pregnant woman a duty would confl ict with 
any duty owed to her future child. Given the undue burdens on women 
to avoid exposing themselves and their families to toxic household 
chemicals, these principles are particularly relevant. 
While the recognition of women’s reproductive autonomy 
attributable to the application of the Anns test in Paxton is important, 
the dominance of proximity and foreseeability in the Anns test renders 
this model problematic in cases where the factual scenario involves 
intergenerational harms caused by ongoing, diff use exposures to 
household chemicals. Foreseeability might be addressed simply by 
the knowledge that household chemicals may adversely aff ect the 
reproductive system. However, if there is widespread public knowledge 
that exposures are harmful, the onus might equally fall to consumers 
to avoid products containing these chemicals. Th e costs of educating 
oneself about household chemicals, of fi nding the right stores and the 
right products with phthalate-free shampoo and fl ame-retardant free 
pajamas will, following Lee and Scott,274 fall to women, plagued by 
273. Mykitiuk & Scott, supra note 116 at 341.
274. See generally Lee & Scott, supra note 20.
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the challenges of engaging in precautionary consumption. For those 
fi nancially or otherwise unable to avoid exposures, seeking damages in 
tort might not be an option due to diffi  culty in pointing to a duty of care 
or in establishing causation, depending on the nature of the particular 
situation. Further, proximity in such cases could be easily undermined by 
an understanding that only those exposed are eligible to seek damages, 
mitigating problems of indeterminate liability. 
In addition, the recognition of birth or life with a disability as a 
legal harm has important implications for the disability community, 
insofar as “disability comes to be seen as an injury, something located 
in the individual, and something for which someone ought to be held 
at fault.”275 Alternative approaches such as judgements that do not 
identify being born with a disability as a harm, but rather provide for 
the fi nancial costs of living with a disability in contemporary society 
(following Cooperman),276 may work to identify the problematic nature 
of theorizing birth and life as harms, while providing for peoples’ needs. 
Reproductive torts jurisprudence needs to consider the diversity of 
human experience while recognizing the needs plaintiff s may experience 
in living with or raising a child with a disability. 
Overall, reproductive tort law off ers insightful principles for 
approaching cases involving the adverse health outcomes linked to 
exposures to brominated fl ame retardants and/or phthalates. However, 
the potential for obtaining a remedy is limited. Given the state of the 
science, demonstrating a clear relationship between exposures and 
physiological harms incurred is unlikely, and defendants are not easily 
identifi ed. Moreover, success for claims of intergenerational reproductive 
harm caused by exposures to household chemicals is unlikely under 
Canadian tort law. 
What remains is that Canadians and others continue to be exposed 
to household chemicals suspected of causing harms to the reproductive 
systems of those exposed, and to future generations. Existing animal and 
275. Jennifer Ann Rinaldi, “Wrongful Life and Wrongful Birth: Th e 
Devaluation of Life with Disability” (2009) 1:1 Journal of Public Policy, 
Administration and Law 1 at 6.
276. Cooperman, supra note 177 at 14-15. 
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human studies, as noted above, demonstrate important implications of 
these exposures, to the extent that particular phthalates have already 
been banned from the Canadian marketplace. If tort law is insuffi  cient 
to address these intergenerational reproductive harms, then further study 
is required to establish how chemical and product manufacturers can 
be deterred from causing the injuries associated with production of 
these chemicals, how states can better regulate their use, and what legal 
recourse can be sought if and when all else fails.
